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In recent years, performance based accountability regimes have become 
increasingly prevalent throughout government.  This dissertation explores the role 
of performance data in higher education policymaking, both in terms of external 
accountability and oversight, and in terms of internal management.  At the center of 
this discussion are debates about the proper role of quantifiable data about 
institutional performance and the appropriateness of various approaches for 
measuring and tracking student success.  As tuition rates have skyrocketed and the 
American economy has faced increased pressure from the international arena, 
American universities have struggled to satisfy demands for improved 
performance. Policymakers have responded to these concerns by pursuing a range 
of policies aimed at increased accountability and a heightened emphasis on 
organizational performance, particularly with respect to budgeting.  Similarly, 
many organizations have employed their own voluntary systems to track various 
metrics of performance as a tool to enhance internal management and improve 
student outcomes.   
But despite the widespread these popularity of accountability policies, and 
the increased availability of quantitative performance data, there remain substantial 
questions about the extent to which these reforms have been successfully integrated 
into policymaking and implementation.  This dissertation draws on data collected 
from publicly available datasets (IPEDS), in combination with a survey of 
presidents at public colleges and universities, to assess the impacts of performance 
xii 
funding and performance management in higher education.  In doing so, it makes 
important contributions to literatures on performance management as well as 
political control and bureaucratic values. 
Chapter III focuses on performance regimes and their impacts on agency 
budgets, while Chapter IV centers on issues related to the role of performance 
information in inter-institutional policymaking.  Chapter V examines the factors 
related to the use of performance management strategies for internal management 
functions.  Overall, the findings suggest that performance funding policies have 
generally been ineffective and that they have often become highly politicized and 
ideologically driven.  Particular emphasis is placed on thinking about the causal 
logic of performance based accountability, as well as the role of bureaucratic values 
and organizational capacity in shaping the effectiveness of these reforms.
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 Chapter I - Introduction 
In recent years, performance based accountability regimes have become 
increasingly prevalent throughout government.  One area where this trend has 
become salient is higher education (Huisman and Currie 2004; King 2007; 
McLendon, Hearn, and Deaton 2006).  As tuition rates have skyrocketed and the 
American economy has faced increased pressure from the international arena, 
American universities have struggled to satisfy demands for improved 
performance. According to the most recent data, the average public college in 
America graduates less than 60% of its students, and graduation rates for many 
minority groups are even lower (Carey 2008).  This has caused a significant shift in 
the way that we think about the need for accountability and transparency with 
regards to higher education.  Whereas policymakers a generation ago were often 
willing to take a more passive and hands off approach to regulation and oversight 
of public universities, today there are increasing demands for universities to be held 
accountable for performance, particularly with respect to costs and undergraduate 
student outcomes (Casper and Henry 2001; Liefner 2003; Zumeta 2001).    
At the center of this new trend are debates about the proper role of 
quantifiable data about institutional performance and the appropriateness of various 
approaches for measuring and tracking student success (Archibald and Feldman 
2008; Espeland and Sauder 2007; Ewell 2007; Kuh and Ikenberry 2009; 
McLaughlin and McLaughlin 2007; Spellings 2006).  Today, more than ever, 
public universities are often required to collect, report, and analyze data across a 
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wide range of performance indicators.  Further, universities are increasingly 
developing their own internal systems to track various forms of performance 
outcomes so as to be more efficient and effective.   
But despite the widespread availability of this data, there remain substantial 
concerns about the extent to which it has been successfully integrated into 
policymaking and implementation (Aldeman and Carey 2009; Burke and 
Minassians 2003).  Too often, some observers worry, these performance 
management systems have become irrelevant, with performance information buried 
in lengthy tomes that few people ever read or access (Aldeman and Carey 2009).  
Others are concerned that even when these data systems are taken seriously and are 
given substantial weight in policymaking and management decisions, they will 
create perverse incentives for institutions to game performance data at the cost of 
equity and access, particularly for low-income and minority students (Fryar 2011; 
Huisman and Currie 2004).   
This dissertation explores the role of performance data in higher education 
policymaking, both in terms of external accountability and oversight, and in terms 
of internal management.  The central theme that guides this project is a quest to 
understand how and why individuals and institutions, in various contexts, use (or 
do not use) performance data, and whether this shift towards data driven 
governance has had meaningful consequences, good or bad. 
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External Accountability: The Case of Performance Funding in Higher 
Education 
In terms of state-driven accountability policies, this trend towards 
performance management has largely manifested itself through budgetary reforms 
and increased information reporting requirements.  In some cases, this has involved 
relatively superficial and symbolic attempts to gather and publicize information 
about university performance, but in others this has resulted in a shift towards the 
adoption of performance funding policies that are designed to directly tie 
institutional funding to benchmark indicators on student outcomes (Burke and 
Minassians 2003).  These performance funding policies have been quite 
controversial and garnered considerable attention from academics and practitioners 
alike (Aldeman and Carey 2009; Dougherty and Reddy 2011; Herbst 2007; 
McLendon, Hearn, and Deaton 2006).   
Those in favor of performance funding lament the lack of external pressure 
on institutions to improve student outcomes and have emphasized the importance 
of using outcome measures as a way to incentivize improved institutional 
performance (Aldeman and Carey 2009; Burke and Minassians 2003; Kelly, 
Schneider, and Carey 2010).  Rather than allocating resources primarily on the 
basis of inputs (such as enrollments), these reformers seek to shift the funding 
mechanisms to student outcomes, such as graduation rates and degree production.  
They argue that under traditional budget arrangements, universities often have little 
incentive to care much about student outcomes, and have thus tended to focus their 
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energies elsewhere.  As a result, many believe that public universities do not 
adequately devote resources to ensure that students complete their degree and attain 
positive post-graduate employment outcomes (Aldeman and Carey 2009; Burke 
2005; Carey 2008; Complete College America 2010b).  By reformulating the 
incentives that institutions face, such that they are rewarded or punished primarily 
based on actual performance rather than simple input measures, performance 
funding advocates seek to stimulate shifts in institutional behavior that will result in 
greater efficiency and productivity.   
This, of course, assumes that institutions are currently inefficient, that they 
are not already allocating resources and attention in optimal ways, and that shifts in 
institutional behavior, particularly with regards to placing greater emphasis on 
undergraduate education and student retention and completion, will, in fact, 
improve performance.  Critics have questioned many of these assumptions and 
have pointed out that performance funding could potentially result in a narrow 
focus on a small number of indicators, which could cause institutions arbitrarily 
raise admissions standards so as to deny access for students that are harder to 
educate or to dilute the quality of education via grade inflation in order to improve 
their “performance” as measured by these funding systems (and thus boost their 
budgets) (Fryar 2011; Hunt 2008; Wellman 2001; Zumeta 2001).   
Despite the widespread attention these policies have received, we still know 
remarkably little about what impacts they might be having.  While there have been 
a few notable attempts to uncover the impacts associated with these higher 
 
                                                                                                                         5 
education performance funding policies (Dougherty and Reddy 2011; Shin and 
Milton 2004; Shin 2010; Volkwein and Tandberg 2008), our knowledge about 
them has thus far largely been based on anecdotal evidence and limited case studies 
(Banta, Rudolph, Dyke, and Fisher 1996; Doyle and Noland 2006; Sanford and 
Hunter 2010).  In particular, the basic logic of these policies is premised on the idea 
that by restructuring the financial incentives that institutions face, universities will 
focus more extensively on activities that should improve performance, but it 
remains unclear whether these policies have, in fact, reformed financial incentives, 
or whether institutions have responded in meaningful ways. 
Further, while much of the discussion about accountability and performance 
in higher education has rightly focused on the ways that state-level actors hold 
universities accountable, this narrow focus on political control paints an incomplete 
picture of the role that data and performance information has played in higher 
education policymaking.  Anecdotal and case-study research reveals that public 
universities are not passive in the adoption or implementation of performance 
management regimes (Dougherty and Natow 2009; Dougherty and Reddy 2011; 
Dougherty et al. 2010).  Rather, they often actively participate in selecting 
measures and designing the policies themselves.  Further, as the external 
environment in many states has become increasingly hostile to higher education, 
some universities have begun to think about ways to use performance data 
strategically in order to build political support and demonstrate public value.  As 
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one university president said in a recent survey conducted by the National Center 
for Public Policy and Higher Education:  
“If we can come up with a way of demonstrating that we have impact, 
and somehow getting our arms around the metrics that express that, I 
think we’ll be doing ourselves and the future of the country a great favor. 
I’m guardedly optimistic. We have in higher education such a difficult 
time showing the impact of what we do, whether it’s a department that is 
making a change in a curriculum or a university that’s refocusing its 
efforts to be more fully engaged in economic development. We just don’t 
do a very good job of being able to account for all of that in the same 
way that a business can, for example, demonstrate the impact on the 
bottom line (Immerwahr, Johnson, and Gasbarra 2008).”   
 
Thus, if we want to understand the impacts of performance information on 
higher education policymaking, it is important to consider the capacity for 
universities to behave strategically.  While the dominant narrative regarding higher 
education and accountability suggests that performance data is often used to target 
institutions or to limit their autonomy, there are likely to be many instances where 
universities purposively use data to improve external relations, build political 
support, and pursue their own goals.  
Voluntary Performance Management Systems: Internal Use of Performance 
Data 
In addition to mandatory, externally imposed performance policies that 
have dominated the inter-institutional policymaking environment, many public 
universities have employed voluntary internal systems that seek to connect 
performance information with administrative practices in ways that will improve 
student outcomes.  As opposed to the external, inter-institutional accountability 
policies discussed previously, these systems are generally more inwardly focused.  
 
                                                                                                                         7 
Rather than the oversight/control framework that dominates external systems of 
performance management and budgeting, these systems are designed to be used by 
managers in their staff for internal organizational purposes.  In this context, 
performance data represents a mechanism for managers to identify strengths and 
weaknesses, to measure improvement over time, to learn from mistakes, and, 
ultimately, to improve performance (Behn 2003; Ewell 2011; Moynihan and 
Landuyt 2009; Spillane 2012). 
Despite the potential benefits associated with performance management, 
institutions also face several challenges in implementing performance management 
systems.  These include both technical limitations and challenges related to 
organizational culture.  With regards to technical limitations, universities, like any 
other organization seeking to implement a new performance management system 
faces challenges related to the design of appropriate measures, the construction of 
databases and computer systems to record and track results, and expertise 
associated with quantitative analysis of this data (Ewell 2011).  Because higher 
education involves a complex assortment of goals and activities, designing 
adequate outcome measures that are valid and reliably capture the multifaceted 
nature of performance in higher education performance is not as straightforward as 
we have seen in some other policy areas, such as transportation, where it is perhaps 
easier to identify and isolate appropriate metrics of organizational performance 
(Poister, Pasha, and Edwards 2012).  Further, as state budgets have become 
constrained in recent years, and appropriations to public universities have fallen, 
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many institutions have very few slack resources to devote to new programs and 
management systems. 
In terms of organizational culture, universities have traditionally seen 
themselves as complex organizations that are responsible for more than vocational 
training, and this makes issues related to quantified measurement of performance 
complicated.  Many of the things that universities seek to do for students, such as 
encouraging long-term personal development and exposing them to new ideas, 
experiences, and perspectives are difficult, if not impossible, to quantify.  Further, 
as the external political environment has become increasingly hostile to higher 
education, faculty and staff often perceive these data systems as an attempt by 
university administrators to encroach on their autonomy and expertise, which can 
create a dysfunctional environment characterized by fear and mistrust rather than 
learning and adaptation (Ewell 2011).  Thus, there remain several questions about 
both the extent and effectiveness of performance information use within public 
universities (Coburn and Turner 2012; Colyvas 2012; Ewell 2011). 
Theoretical Contributions 
 This dissertation project seeks to make several important theoretical 
contributions to literatures in public policy and public administration.  First and 
foremost is the literature on performance management, especially the more recent 
work regarding utilization of performance data (Van Dooren and Van De Walle 
2008; Moynihan 2008).  Much of this scholarship seeks to understand the 
conditions under which actors in various institutional contexts (citizens, executives, 
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legislators, managers, etc…) will use performance data to substantively inform 
decisions and craft policy.  Higher education is an obvious place to examine these 
questions, for a couple reasons.  First, as previously discussed, this is a timely topic 
that has received considerable attention throughout the higher education 
community in recent years.  More importantly, it provides area with considerable 
variation, on both institutional/political variables (state governance characteristics 
and external political environment), and organizational variables (mission, size, 
selectivity, resources, etc…).  This gives substantial leverage to examine many of 
the theoretical concepts related to the impact and importance of these variables with 
respect to performance information use. 
 Secondly, this dissertation exploits variation in the institutional settings and 
actors involved with internal and external performance management systems to 
better clarify the situations in which data-driven decision making is likely to be 
productive.  This speaks to the heart of questions related to the importance of 
institutional design and the mechanisms for learning and change, at both the 
individual and institutional levels.  These topics long have been central to 
scholarship related to both policy process (Jones and Baumgartner 2005; Sabatier 
and Jenkins-Smith 1993) and organizational theory (Argyris 1993; Levitt and 
March 1988; March and Olson 1983).  Further, much of this discussion regarding 
performance data in higher education centers on debates about control and 
oversight, with questions about the extent to which quantitative performance data 
can reduce information asymmetries and improve external oversight, and about the 
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ways in which organizations can use information to build political support and 
attain greater autonomy (Dougherty and Reddy 2011).  Thus, this dissertation can 
make serious contributions to theory in areas related to literatures on political 
control and bureaucratic values. 
 Third, as previously discussed, higher education represents a policy area 
where it is challenging, though perhaps not entirely unreasonable, to use 
performance management effectively.  These institutions have diverse goals and 
missions, some of which (such as graduation rates and retention) are fairly easy to 
track quantitatively, but others (such as personal growth and development, overall 
contributions to culture, knowledge, and diversity) that are much more difficult to 
measure.  In contrast to some of the other types of public agencies where some 
researchers have found performance management to be effective (Behn 2006; 
Broadnax and Conway 2001; Poister, Pasha, and Edwards 2012; D. C. Smith and 
Bratton 2001), many of which have tended to be relatively narrow and technically 
oriented, higher education is considerably more complicated and messy.  This 
“messiness” with regards to performance, however, is representative of the 
experiences that many, if not most, public agencies face (Radin 2006).  Thus, as we 
think about potential of performance management with respect to improving 
performance throughout the public sector, insights from experiences with 
performance data and information use in higher education are advantageous in 
terms of identifying challenges and limitations.  
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Additionally, as a result of federal and state reporting requirements, higher 
education has already developed a relatively well established indicators and 
performance metrics.  As opposed to some other areas, where performance metrics 
and guidelines for data measurement are less well established, this makes it 
considerably easier to understand the way that actors perceive attempts to measure 
performance, and to evaluate the relationship between managerial and 
organizational behavior various performance metrics.  On the other hand, 
performance measurement in higher education remains open for discussion and 
debate, and is thus not so rigid as to preclude variation in terms of perceptions 
regarding the validity and legitimacy of competing approaches to measure.  In other 
words, performance data in higher education is well developed enough to connect 
with theoretical concepts such as efficiency and equity, but is also subject to the 
kinds of persistent debate and disagreement that characterize policymaking across a 
wide range of areas.  Thus, it provides real leverage to understand how issues 
related to the development and maturation of these systems affect questions of 
policy process and policy implementation. 
Chapter Outline 
Chapter II discusses the theoretical literatures in public administration and 
public policy that will be used to frame this discussion and generate hypotheses.  In 
particular, chapter II will define key concepts related to performance management 
and information use/utilization and will discuss important differences in the 
meaning and use of these concepts across institutional boundaries and 
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policymaking settings.  This chapter also lays the foundation to inform subsequent 
efforts at model specification and identification of important causal relationships 
between the dependent variables of interest and their respective predictors.  
Chapter III focuses on performance regimes and their impacts on agency 
budgets.  As previously mentioned, states have increasingly moved towards a 
model of funding formulas that include quantitative measures of performance in 
recent years. This chapter will speaks to a well-developed line of scholarship on the 
effectiveness of performance reforms in public budgeting, but will also have 
implications for policy debates surrounding these controversial funding policies.  
One the main goals of these policies is to reform the budgetary process so as to 
restructure the financial incentives that universities face vis-à-vis student 
achievement, but it remains unclear whether they have been successful at doing so, 
and if so, whether this has had any noticeable impact on institutional behavior.   
Chapter III uses a publicly available dataset from the Integrated 
Postsecondary Data System (IPEDS), which is collected and administered by the 
Department of Education and covers all public 4-year universities in the United 
States, to uncover what impacts (if any) performance funding policies have had on 
state appropriations to public colleges and universities with regards to linkages with 
student performance.  Further, chapter also examines institutional spending patterns 
to determine if performance funding policies have been effective in reshaping 
institutional priorities with respect to research and undergraduate instruction. 
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Chapter IV centers on issues related to the role of performance information 
in inter-institutional policymaking.  This chapter will be of particular relevance for 
those interested in issues related to political control, bureaucratic politics, and inter-
institutional dynamics.  More specifically, this chapter is focused on understanding 
university presidents’ perceptions regarding the appropriateness of performance 
based funding.  To do so, I rely on a survey of public university presidents that was 
conducted following the 2011-2012 school year.   
Chapter V uses the aforementioned survey data to understand why 
organizations choose to employ performance management strategies.  A developing 
body of research has suggested that performance management may be of much 
greater use at the organizational level than it is in inter-institutional contexts, but it 
remains unclear why some organizations heavily use quantitative performance data 
while others do not (Van Dooren and Van De Walle 2008; Moynihan and Pandey 
2010).  Further, given the wide range of tasks that performance management might 
be useful for, there remain important questions about differences in use for various 
goals and activities (Behn 2003).  This chapter explores the factors that shape 
decisions about whether to use performance information for internal management 
and the challenges that managers face in implementing performance management 
systems. These findings should be of particular value to public management 
scholars, especially those who are interested in understanding processes of 
organizational change and learning.   
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Finally, chapter VI concludes with a discussion of key findings and 
implications for both theory and practice.  Performance management continues to 
be a popular topic amongst both academics and practitioners, and there remain 
several questions about its impacts on public universities.  This dissertation seeks to 
contribute to a growing literature on performance information and its role in public 
policymaking and public administration, by focusing on whether (and how) 
performance information influences actors throughout the policymaking process to 
behave differently than they would in the absence of this information.  This, as I 
will argue more extensively in chapter II, is the key to determining the value of 
performance management systems in higher education.   
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 Chapter II – Theoretical Framework 
Efforts to design, collect, disseminate, and analyze measures of 
performance in order to hold agencies accountable and promote organizational 
learning have come to play a dominant role in public administration over the last 
two decades (Brudney et al 1999; Frederickson and Frederickson 2006; Melkers 
and Willoughby 1998; Moynihan 2008; Radin 2006).  Although these attempts to 
incorporate quantitative measures of performance into public management systems 
are hardly new (Van Dooren 2008; Williams 2003), there has been a particularly 
strong trend towards greater use of this information in the public sector in recent 
years. In an era that has been marked by widespread distrust of government and 
skepticism about the effectiveness of public organizations, citizens and 
policymakers have increasingly pushed for accountability mechanisms that focus 
on outcomes and impacts rather than inputs and outputs (Radin 2006).  As a result, 
virtually every public agency, at all levels of government, now collects and reports 
data on a variety of performance indicators.  As Beryl Radin writes, this 
performance management “movement” has become “a pervasive element in the 
world we live in (2006, 1).”   And yet, there remain serious questions about 
whether this shift towards performance has been good, bad, or inconsequential. 
One area where this discussion has become salient is higher education.  In 
recent years, there have been several initiatives, at both the state and federal levels, 
to directly link performance to funding (Aldeman and Carey 2009; Burke 2002; 
Spellings 2006; Zumeta 2001).  In addition to these mandatory performance 
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policies, many public universities have employed voluntary internal systems that 
seek to connect performance information with administrative practices in ways that 
will improve student outcomes.  This dissertation project examines these recent 
experiences with performance management in higher education to gain leverage on 
important questions regarding the use of performance information policymakers 
and public managers.  In doing so, I also hope to shed light on recent debates 
related to governance and the appropriate role of accountability and student 
outcome data in higher education policy. 
What is “Performance Management”? 
Before proceeding any further, it is probably a good idea to provide a basic 
definition for what I mean by “performance management,” as the term has come to 
be used in varying ways in existing scholarship.  I adopt Donald Moynihan’s 
definition of performance management as “a system that generates performance 
information through strategic planning and performance measurement routines and 
that connects this information to decision venues, where, ideally, the information 
influences a range of possible decisions (Moynihan 2008, 5).”  It is important to 
note that this definition encompasses a broad spectrum of activities that revolve 
around the use of performance data, including budgeting and external 
accountability (i.e. “performance funding”) as well as the use of data by agency 
leaders to influence day to day management.   
In addition to acknowledging the wide range of institutional settings and 
venues where performance management occurs, this definition is particularly 
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useful, I argue, because it places explicit emphasis on mechanisms by which 
performance information influences behavior and decisions.  In other words, it 
forces us to ask “What is it that policymakers and other actors actually do with this 
data (if anything)?” 
This focus on human decision-making is valuable because draws our 
attention to the fact that performance data, on its own, is relatively powerless as a 
change agent.  Rather, the information that these systems produce must be given 
meaning by human actors.  For instance, according to the latest available data, 
approximately 63 percent of undergraduate students at the University of Oklahoma 
earn a bachelor’s degree in six years or less (IPEDS 2011).  OU also has lower 
entrance requirements, charges less for tuition, and collects less in state 
appropriations than many other flagship institutions (IPEDS 2011), and 
Oklahoma’s K-12 system has historically performed poorly on a variety of 
indicators (NCES 2011).  Given these facts, does a 63 percent graduation rate 
signify strong performance despite the many challenges that the university faces, or 
is there is a problem that needs to be addressed? If it is the latter, then who is 
responsible, and what should policymakers and agency officials do in order to try 
and achieve a more desirable outcome?  Raw data, though potentially useful as a 
way to provide context and basic information about performance, cannot answer 
these important questions.  Ultimately, then, whatever effects that performance 
regimes have on public management (both good and bad) will be the result of their 
impact on human behavior and decision making.  In this sense, performance data is 
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meaningful only insofar as it causes human actors to behave in a manner that they 
would not do otherwise.   
Performance Management and NPM  
Several scholars, including Moynihan, have argued that recent performance 
reforms are closely linked to New Public Management (NPM) and “reinventing 
government” doctrines that emphasized a shift towards orienting accountability 
mechanisms on results rather than compliance or procedural control (Van Dooren 
2008; Frederickson and Frederickson 2006; Moynihan 2008; Radin 2006).  The 
NPM doctrine argues that traditional approaches to public management have left 
many organizations overly encumbered by rigid rules and poorly structured 
incentives that result in inefficiency, waste, and underperformance.  Public 
managers, NPM reformers argued, should be given greater freedom to be 
entrepreneurial and flexible in pursuit of solutions to complex problems, but should 
then be held accountable if their solutions do not work (and rewarded if they do) 
(Barzelay 1992; Hood 1991; Osborne and Gaebler 1992).  Thus, performance 
management systems both serve as a check against managerial discretion, and as a 
learning tool that helps organizations to identify problems and chart progress 
towards long-term strategic goals (Behn 2003). 
Performance Management: Three Views 
Scholarship on performance management can generally be separated into 
three camps.  First are the proponents, who see performance management as a tool 
for government reform that can: 1) promote rationality and objective assessments 
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of programs as an alternative to politically biased mechanisms of funding and 
support, 2) enhance long-term strategic planning by connecting pre-defined goals 
with measurable outcomes, 3) improve accountability by reducing information 
asymmetries between political actors and the bureaucracy, and 4) result in 
organizational learning and improvement so that government agencies can better 
address difficult social problems such as poverty, crime, and achievement gaps in 
educational attainment (Barzelay 1992; Behn 2003; Broadnax and Conway 2001; 
Burke 2005; Hatry 2006; Keehley et al 1997; Osborne and Gaebler 1992; Smith 
and Bratton 2001; Thomas 2001).   
Second are critics, who argue that performance management is usually 
ineffective at accomplishing many of its stated goals and that it often incentivizes 
dysfunctional behavior (Bohte and Meier 2000; Durant 2008; Jacob and Levitt 
2003; Joyce and Thompkins 2002; Marshke 2001; Radin 2000, 2006; van Thiel and 
Leeuw 2002; Wilson et al 2006).  In large part, critics contend that performance 
regimes are based on faulty assumptions regarding the nature of policy debates, the 
practical realities of policy implementation, and the limits of human cognition.  As 
a result, they argue that these reforms rarely work as well in the real world as 
proponents promise.  
Finally are those whom I categorize as the cautiously optimistic.  These 
scholars are largely sympathetic to the claims made by critics regarding the 
shortcomings of performance management systems, but they also see potential for 
these reforms, under the right conditions, to have a positive impact on governance 
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(Franklin 2000; Grizzle and Pettijohn 2002; Heinrich 1999; Melkers and 
Willoughby 2001; Moynihan 2008; Schick 2001; Streib and Poister 1999; 
Thurmaier and Willoughby 2001; Wang 2002).  Much of the research in this vein 
has concluded that performance management typically has negligible impacts on 
issues related to external accountability, control, and budgeting, but that there is 
reason to be optimistic about the possibilities for these reforms to lead to internal 
dynamics within agencies that promote learning and change (Moynihan 2008).  As 
the empirical chapters to follow demonstrate, this dissertation project fits best 
within this third camp. 
How is Performance Information Used? 
Despite the extensive debate regarding the pros and cons of performance 
management, there has, until very recently, been relatively little progress in 
establishing a theoretically motivated empirical research agenda to understand how 
and why performance information is used by various actors in the policymaking 
process (Van De Walle and Van Dooren 2008; de Lancer Julnes 2008; Moynihan 
and Pandey 2010; Pollitt 2006a).  One hurdle in achieving theoretical development 
regarding the use of performance information is the multi-dimensional nature of the 
subject.  As de Lancer Julnes (2008) notes, there are strong parallels between the 
types of potential uses for performance information and the modes of utilization 
that Carol Weiss (1979, 1998) observed in studies of program evaluation and policy 
analysis.  While most scholars have tended to focus on “instrumental” use, where 
performance information is directly connected to decision-making, there are other 
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forms of use that are also important.  Chief amongst these are “enlightenment,” 
where performance information carves out the boundaries for debate and can 
influence long-term shifts in policy, and “persuasion,” where actors use 
performance information to defend pre-existing preferences and ideological 
positions (De Lancer Julnes 2008; Weiss 1979, 1998).  Research from the literature 
on theories of the policymaking process finds that these latter two forms of use are 
often the primary channels for influence of social science research and analysis on 
policy change (Jenkins-Smith 1988; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993).   
As previously discussed, performance management systems have the dual 
purpose of improving external accountability mechanisms for the purposes of 
political control, and promoting internal learning within an organization.  Thus, 
when thinking about the potential uses of performance information, it is also 
important to consider an actor’s institutional position, as this is likely to influence 
their motivations for use, their access to expertise necessary to put performance 
numbers into an appropriate context, and the rules that govern the number and type 
of other decision-makers who have access to the venue in which they operate (Behn 
2003; de Lancer Julnes 2008; Moynihan 2008).  Citizens and lawmakers are 
situated in roles that lead them to be primarily concerned with control and 
accountability, while managers are often focused more on implementing changes 
that result from performance management systems (Behn 2003; de Lancer Julnes 
2008; Moynihan 2008).   
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Performance Information Use by Elected Officials 
The primary mechanism that elected officials have for using performance 
information is in the budget process.  The logic of performance management rests 
on the assumption that budget makers can use appropriations to reward agencies 
that perform well and punish those that perform poorly.  In doing so, they hope to 
create incentives for managers that mimic the bottom-line/profit motivator from the 
private sector.  Ideally, these new incentives will result in changes in behavior that 
are then translated into improved performance and desirable client outcomes. A 
considerable body of research, however, suggests that performance information is 
rarely used (in instrumental terms at least) by elected officials (Brudney et al 1999; 
Gilmour and Lewis 2006a, 2006b; Hou et al 2011; Joyce 1999; Melkers and 
Willoughby 2001; Moynihan 2008; Newcomer 2007; van Thiel and Leeuw 2002; 
Thurmaier and Willoughby 2001; U.S. GAO 2005a, 2005b).   
One explanation for this lack of use is that performance metrics are not, 
despite the claims of some reformers, value neutral (Stone 1988).  Because policy 
debates generally center on normative values regarding the appropriateness of 
various kinds of government activity (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993), people 
possess intensely held beliefs regarding the dimensions along which performance 
should be measured. These normative differences make it virtually impossible for 
actors to agree on a single measure of performance, and frustrate attempts to reach 
consensus on the appropriate weights to assign to performance on indicators 
attached to competing outcomes (Frederickson and Frederickson 2006; Nathan 
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2005; van Thiel and Leeuw 2002). Thus, performance management systems tend to 
either focus on a handful of contentious indicators, such that many actors perceive 
the entire regime as illegitimate and are thus unwilling to use this information as a 
basis for decision making, or they include so many indicators as to completely 
dilute the importance and meaning of any single measure, negating the purpose of 
the exercise. 
Second, as both Gilmour and Lewis (2006b) and Moynihan (2008) point 
out, it can be unclear whether poor performance should be met with reduced or 
increased funding.  Some observers may interpret poor performance as evidence 
that an organization needs additional resources in order to accomplish important 
tasks, and thus push for more funding.  For example, many critics of K-12 
accountability policies, such as No Child Left Behind (NCLB), contend that these 
regimes are likely to create negative feedback loops that make it virtually 
impossible for schools serving vulnerable and at-risk populations to close 
achievement gaps or improve student outcomes (Neill 2003).  Many times, 
determinations on how to interpret performance data are driven by ideological 
preferences regarding the value/merit of the program, rather than on any objective 
assessment of performance data.  Thus, performance management systems are often 
unable to overcome the cognitive limitations and biases that result in political 
gridlock and incrementalism.   
Despite the sobering evidence on the lack of instrumental use by 
lawmakers, there are some reasons to believe that information about performance 
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can still be an important factor that shapes policymaking and oversight, though 
perhaps not in the ways that NPM reformers have advocated. For instance, even 
though performance funding systems often fail to materialize the desired shifts in 
economic incentives, we may still observe positive responses from agency leaders.  
In the area of higher education, for example, Dougherty and Reddy (2011) note that 
university presidents have sometimes responded to performance funding policies 
aggressively, not because they believe that doing so will improve their budgets, but 
rather because they are competitive personality types who want to earn “bragging 
rights” against other institutions and boost their own egos.  Others find that even 
when these policies are mostly symbolic, they can send powerful signals to agency 
leaders regarding the preferences of external stakeholders (Dougherty and Reddy 
2011; Moynihan 2008, 2009).  Sometimes the mere threat of performance based 
accountability can be enough to drive agency leaders to act (though perhaps not as 
dramatically as they would if sanctions and incentives were actually present).   
Unfortunately, we need still need more systematic research regarding the 
mechanisms by which performance funding policies are designed to operate, 
particularly in areas such as higher education.  The causal logic that underlies 
performance accountability mechanisms implies that incentives will be restructured 
in a way that results in changes in management that are geared towards improving 
performance with respect to client outcomes.  Sadly, however, much of the research 
that examines the impacts of these policies, particularly in the area of higher 
education, skips the intermediate links in the causal chain and focuses exclusively 
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on whether their adoption improves performance.  Thus, while several studies have 
emerged in recent years to explore the extent to which these performance funding 
policies are successful in improving student outcomes (Fryar 2011; Sanford and 
Hunter 2010; Shin 2010; Volkwein and Tandberg 2008), many of which suggest 
that they have not been, we know very little about why performance funding has, at 
least to this point, been so ineffective.  If we are to understand anything about why 
these types of policies work or do not work, we must begin by understanding 
whether they are successful in changing the incentive structures that public 
managers face, and whether managers respond to these incentives in the ways that 
policymakers hope they will. 
Second, one might cite the mere fact that debates regarding the construction 
and dissemination of this information are often extremely contentious as evidence 
that these performance regimes are not altogether inconsequential.  If performance 
information was completely irrelevant and no one paid any attention to it, then 
there would be no reason for competing coalitions to expend so much time and 
energy fighting over which indicators are used and how these measures are 
constructed. And yet, previous research has consistently concluded that debates 
regarding the design of performance management systems are often times at the 
center of conflicts regarding agency budgets and legislative oversight, particularly 
in areas like higher education (Dougherty and Natow 2009; Dougherty et al 2010; 
Leslie and Berdahl 2008; Richardson and Martinez 2009; Shakespeare 2008).  
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Further, while it is true that many policy debates are centered on normative 
disputes that are ultimately impossible to resolve through objective criteria, actors 
must still rely on empirical evidence (though perhaps a selective incorporation of 
this evidence) to construct persuasive arguments (Jenkins-Smith 1988; Sabatier and 
Jenkins-Smith 1993).  As such, performance information can be used as part of an 
“interactive dialogue” (Moynihan 2008), where budget debates are shaped by 
attempts at persuasion that are based on interpretations of performance data.  
Despite the subjective nature of data interpretation, performance information can 
tether political arguments to some objective measure of agency productivity.  Thus, 
performance information might not result in direct action, but it can force policy 
actors to ground their arguments on some objective evidence, thereby restricting 
the range of alternatives that are politically viable (Moynihan 2008).   
Finally, while scholars often think about performance metrics as a 
mechanism for oversight and control, it is important to note that agencies might 
also benefit from the use of performance information.  Because there are so many 
ways to measure performance, skillful use of performance information may 
actually be one way that agencies can increase their discretion and autonomy.  By 
constructing measures of performance that statistically demonstrate the value of 
their organization, agency officials might be better positioned to cement their 
credibility as competent experts who political actors should defer to.  Particularly  
in the current political environment, where rhetoric regarding the need for evidence 
based policy is increasingly strong, agencies that can point to objective measures 
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that support their goals and activities are less vulnerable to budget cuts than those 
which rely purely on anecdotal evidence or emotionally charged messages.  As 
Moynihan (2010, 287) writes, “Performance information has not eliminated 
information asymmetry between principals and agents, but it has allowed agents yet 
another means by which to exploit (emphasis original) asymmetry.”  Thus, 
performance data, when wielded correctly, is a tool that bureaucrats can use to 
stave off hostile advocacy coalitions and legislative actors who attempt to slash 
their budgets.   
Performance Information Use by Public Managers 
 In contrast to elected officials and citizens, who are primarily focused on 
external accountability, public managers are largely concerned with improving 
performance.  Ultimately, managers are the actors responsible for delivering results 
in the public sector.  Some argue that more than any other actor in the policy 
process, managers are uniquely well positioned to bring about desirable policy 
outcomes (Meier 2009a).  As such, managerial reactions to performance regimes 
are perhaps more important than the reactions of any other group.  As Moynihan et 
al (forthcoming, 2) write, “Like the question of whether a tree falling in the forest 
creates a sound when no one is around, it is reasonable to ask: ‘If managers do not 
use performance data, is there such a thing as performance management?’” 
Moynihan (2008) argues that instrumental use of performance information 
is much more likely to occur within agencies than in inter-institutional settings, for 
several reasons.  First, he notes that bureaucracies, in contrast to most legislative 
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arrangements, are designed with substantial amounts of hierarchy and clear chains 
of authority, which dramatically reduces the number of influential decision makers 
(and thus the level of consensus needed to act).  Second, the ideological distance 
between actors within a single agency is likely to be considerably less than in most 
legislative venues, reducing the level of disagreement between actors on 
dimensions regarding the value of various goals and activities and the 
appropriateness of selected performance measures.  Not only are most legislatures 
bicameral, which introduces the potential for institutional rivalries between the two 
chambers, but public agencies often have ideologically charged missions, which 
causes individuals with similar beliefs to self-select into an organization (Clinton 
and Lewis 2008; Downs 1967; Golden 2000; Wood 1988).  Finally, as the agents 
responsible for policy implementation, Moynihan (2008) argues that public 
managers have much stronger incentives than politicians (who may be more 
interested in electoral success than crafting “good policy”) to use performance 
information, provided that they believe doing so will improve program outcomes. 
In keeping with this perspective (that performance information is more 
likely to be used instrumentally within organizations than in external accountability 
and political control settings), an emerging literature has developed to explore the 
factors that shape performance information use by public managers.  In large part, 
this literature has tended to focus on three main groups of variables that influence 
information use: 1) external conditions in the political environment, including 
governance structures and institutional designs, and 2) internal conditions related to 
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the organization, including the technical capacity for managers to incorporate 
performance systems into daily operations, and 3) values, beliefs, and personal 
characteristics of organizational leaders (Jennings and Haiste 2004; de Lancer 
Julnes and Holzer 2001; Moynihan and Pandey 2010).  For instance, some scholars 
have found important effects related to commitment and involvement of agency 
leaders, governors, and legislative actors (Askim, Johnsen, and Christophersen 
2008; Behn 2006; Bourdeaux and Chikoto 2008; Dull 2009; Moynihan and 
Ingraham 2004; Moynihan et al forthcoming), and general levels of support from 
the political environment along with external stakeholder involvement (Yang and 
Hsieh 2007).  Others find that organizational structures and cultures that reinforce 
performance routines are critical (Burke and Costello 2005; Franklin 2000; 
Moynihan and Landuyt 2009; Moynihan and Pandey 2010; Moynihan et al 
forthcoming).  Still others focus on the experience and familiarity that managers 
have with performance management systems (Melkers and Willoughby 2005), and 
the capacities that agencies have to implement reform (Berman and Wang 2000).    
While the results from this quickly growing body of research are beginning 
to coalesce around a few key findings regarding performance information use by 
public managers, many of the studies cited above have presented contradictory 
results on important variables. This has led many to call for continued study of 
performance information use, so that we can gain a better sense for causal 
mechanisms that lead to performance management and how these might differ 
across policy areas and task settings  (Ammons and Rivenbark 2008; Kroll 2012; 
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de Lancer Julnes 2008; Moynihan and Hawes 2012; Poister, Pasha, and Edwards 
2012; Yang and Pandey 2009).  As previously discussed, higher education presents 
an attractive empirical case to study these questions, because there is substantial 
variation across several variables of theoretical interest, including the external 
governance, policy and political environment, organizational capacity and mission, 
and individual level attitudes, experiences, and values. 
Second, while scholars have often cited a diversity of goals that 
organizations use performance management strategies to try and achieve (including 
evaluation of employees, strategic planning, and engagement with external 
stakeholders), we know little about how information use differs across these tasks.  
Given that public universities are confronted with substantial ambiguity in terms of 
goals and objectives, that they face substantial constraints in terms of resources, 
and that they must manage relationships with external actors who are often hostile 
and unsupportive, these organizations are well situated to help provide empirical 
leverage towards understanding why patterns of use vary from one agency to the 
next. 
Conclusion 
The chapters that follow make several important contributions to the 
literatures discussed throughout this chapter.  Chapter three takes up the issue of 
incentives and administrative responses to performance funding policies by asking 
whether state governments that have implemented such policies are more likely to 
allocate appropriations to universities on the basis of actual performance (which I 
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measure in a variety of ways).  This chapter also explores the ways that institutions 
have reacted to the adoption of these policies by examining patterns in resource 
allocation to understand whether performance funding policies have resulted in 
meaningful shifts in the priority that public institutions assign to research and 
instruction.  In doing so, this chapter not only contributes to a well established line 
of scholarship regarding the efficacy of performance based budget reforms, but also 
helps understand some of the causal mechanisms upon which performance regimes 
are based.  Further, by exploring administrative reactions to performance policies, 
this chapter allows for a fuller understanding of the impact that performance 
funding has on service delivery, and uncovers additional insights about ways in 
which these policies may be influencing public universities. 
Chapter four speaks most clearly to literatures on political control and inter-
institutional policymaking dynamics.  This chapter uses perceptual data drawn from 
a survey of university presidents to understand linkages between the external 
political environment, the adoption of enhanced performance based accountability 
mechanisms, and perceptions regarding the legitimacy of performance based 
accountability.  Chapter four is thus able to advance theory not as it relates to 
performance management and performance budgeting, but also with regards to 
political control and bureaucratic values. In tandem, chapters three and four allow 
this dissertation to gain remarkable depth on understanding the limitations and 
impacts of performance regimes with regards to the policymaking process. 
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Chapter five explores issues related to the role of performance information 
with regards to internal management.  In doing so, this chapter seeks to address two 
of the biggest questions regarding performance management: 1) Why do 
organizations use performance information and 2) How does use of performance 
data vary for tasks related to evaluation, planning, and engagement?  Again using a 
unique survey instrument, this chapter is particularly well positioned to 
systematically explore patterns of information use.  Further, given that data use 
within organizations has become increasingly common, and has often been 
identified as a crucial step towards improving public sector performance, this 
chapter has strong theoretical and practical relevance.   
For better or worse, performance management is here to stay.  If we want to 
understand the implications this has for public sector organizations, it is critical that 
we address serious gaps in our current understanding of the ways that people, in 
various institutional contexts, use data driven information to pursue their political 
agenda and to advance agency performance.  This dissertation seeks to address 
many of these questions by tracing the influence of performance management 
regimes with respect to budgeting, political control and oversight, and day to day 
management.  In doing so, I hope to advance theory in a number of important ways 
that speak to causal mechanisms and the role of performance information in 
modern governance. 
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 Chapter III: Exploring Impacts of Performance Funding on 
State Budgets and Institutional Spending Patterns 
Research on the increased use of performance information in the public 
sector has been a dominant theme in the management literature over the past 
decade and a half.  Proponents argue that performance based accountability 
structures make it easier for political leaders and the general public to evaluate 
public agency outputs and to impose sanctions when agencies fail to produce 
desired results.  Critics claim such policies are often short-sighted, blind to the 
practical realities that many public managers deal with, and are implemented in 
ways that distort agency missions and result in unintended consequences that 
negatively impact service delivery.  Implicit in this debate is the assumption that 
performance based mechanisms of accountability will, in some way, reform state 
budgets and change service delivery.   
One area where this discussion has become salient is higher education.  In 
recent years, there have been several initiatives, at both the state and federal levels, 
to directly link performance to funding (Aldeman and Carey 2009; Burke 2002; 
Zumeta 2001).  While there have been a few attempts to uncover the impacts 
associated with these higher education performance funding policies (Volkwein 
and Tandberg 2008), our knowledge about them has thus far largely been based on 
anecdotal evidence and limited case studies (Banta, Rudolph, Dyke, and Fisher 
1996; Doyle and Noland 2006; Sanford and Hunter 2010).  As such, there remain 
serious gaps in our empirical knowledge about the extent to which these policies 
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are having substantive impacts on budgetary processes at the state level and on 
service delivery at the organizational level.  This paper uses institutional level data 
from public colleges and universities in all 50 states to determine whether the 
adoption of performance funding policies corresponds with a better link between 
student outcomes (graduation rates, retention, and bachelor’s degrees produced) 
and state appropriations, and whether these policies have any noticeable effects on 
the way that public universities prioritize activities related to research and 
instruction.  
Accountability and the Performance Movement 
Critics have long complained that public organizations tend to be inefficient 
and unresponsive to external stakeholder groups relative to their private 
counterparts (Chubb and Moe 1990; Osborne and Gaebler 1992; J. Q. Wilson 
1989).  Many observers blame this apparent dysfunction on the prevalence of 
incrementalism in the budgetary process, and argue that reform efforts aimed at 
greater utilization of information regarding organizational performance can make 
budgets less political and more merit-based, which will in turn boost cost-
efficiency gains within the public sector (Moynihan 2008; Radin 2006).  By 
rewarding organizations that perform well and sanctioning those that perform 
poorly, policymakers can provide strong incentives for public agencies to reduce or 
eliminate wasteful activities and to employ entrepreneurial strategies in developing 
new technologies and methods to improve service delivery.  Further, by holding 
public agencies accountable for performance, policymakers are able to get more 
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“bang for the buck” by spending less money on programs that do not work and 
more on those that do. 
While performance budgeting has become ubiquitous at all levels of 
government in America over the last fifteen years (Kettl 2000; Melkers and 
Willoughby 1998; Moynihan 2008), empirical research has generally found only 
limited evidence that performance information has a meaningful impact on budget 
decisions, particularly at the state and federal levels of government (Gilmour and 
Lewis 2006a, 2006b; Joyce 1999; Long and Franklin 2004; Moynihan 2008; Radin 
2000).   Why have policymakers been so apt to adopt performance mechanisms if 
they do not use the information that these systems generate?  Moynihan (2008) 
argues that performance policies are often symbolic in nature, and that many times 
there is little commitment to true reform on the part of political actors. 
Even if reform efforts represent a sincere effort to change government, there 
are several factors that can limit the influence of performance information in the 
budgetary process.  As Moynihan (2008) highlights, performance information is 
rarely, if ever, used in a completely neutral or rational way.  Performance must be 
given meaning by human decision-makers, which makes it inherently political and 
subjective.  For instance, there is often times significant disagreement within the 
policy community about the legitimacy of various indicators. This inhibits 
information use because many actors view the data that performance regimes 
generate with distrust, and are thus unlikely to engage in meaningful learning 
(Moynihan 2008; Radin 2006).   
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Second, as both Gilmour and Lewis (2006b) and Moynihan (2008) point 
out, it can be unclear whether poor performance should be met with reduced or 
increased funding.  Some observers may interpret poor performance as evidence 
that an organization needs additional resources in order to accomplish important 
tasks, and thus push for more funding.  For example, many critics of K-12 
accountability policies, such as No Child Left Behind (NCLB), contend that these 
regimes are likely to create negative feedback loops that make it virtually 
impossible for schools serving vulnerable and at-risk populations to close 
achievement gaps or improve student outcomes (Neill 2003).   
Finally, given the potential for budgetary reforms to create new sets of 
winners and losers, it is reasonable to expect that affected agencies will seek to 
influence policy design in a way that protects their interests (Moynihan 2008).  As 
such, organizations with resource advantages, particularly in terms of political 
influence, are more likely to secure performance regimes that emphasize indicators 
they will score satisfactorily on, and as a result, performance budgeting would be 
unlikely to dramatically change the funding landscape.   
Regardless of their impact on budgetary actors, performance funding 
policies ultimately aim to influence public sector service delivery.  Proponents 
argue that public administrators will react to performance based incentives by 
adopting management strategies that increase efficiency and improve performance.  
Further, some argue that performance based systems, when properly designed and 
implemented, have the potential to promote organizational learning by helping 
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managers to identify problems and to more systematically assess the strengths and 
weaknesses of programs (Behn 2003; Moynihan 2008).   
Critics, however, warn that performance systems, particularly when they are 
imposed in a top-down manner with little differentiation to account for important 
variation in terms of task difficulty or resource availability, can lead to perverse 
incentives that harm client populations (Radin 2006; P. Smith 1990).  In some 
cases, administrators may respond to unrealistic accountability requirements by 
“gaming the system” to manipulate data such that indicators are no longer valid 
measures of performance (Booher-Jennings 2005; Figlio and Getzler 2002; Heilig 
and Darling-Hammond 2008; Jacob and Levitt 2003; Jacob 2005).  In other cases, 
administrators focus more heavily on tasks that boost scores in the short-term, at 
the expense of developing a long-term strategic plan to improve outcomes 
(Abernathy 2007).  Finally, administrators may react to performance regimes they 
perceive as illegitimate and unreasonable by adopting a strategy of resistance where 
they change little, if anything in terms of service delivery, and then attempt to 
undermine or marginalize the role of performance information in program 
assessment (Radin 2006).  Since many performance reform efforts have historically 
proven to be short-lived and primarily symbolic in nature, public managers often 
rightly perceive that they can simply wait things out without exerting much time or 
energy to re-design program activities. 
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Performance Funding in Higher Education 
Within the area of higher education, performance based accountability has 
become an area of significant attention in the past decade (Huisman and Currie 
2004; King 2007; McLendon, Hearn, and Deaton 2006).  In an era that has seen 
tuition rates skyrocket and increased pressure from the international arena, 
American universities have struggled to satisfy demands for improved 
performance. According to the most recent data, the average public college in 
America graduates less than 60% of its students and graduation rates for many 
minority groups are much lower than that (Carey 2008).  This has caused many to 
call for major reforms that make institutions of higher learning more accountable 
for student outcomes (Aldeman and Carey 2009; Casper and Henry 2001; Kelly, 
Schneider, and Carey 2010; Liefner 2003). 
 Starting in the late 1990s, Joseph Burke began surveying state higher 
education officials to better understand the landscape of accountability in higher 
education (Burke 2002).  In doing so, he developed a three-tiered classification of 
accountability policies.  At the lowest level, Burke classified states as having 
performance reporting policies.  These states gather data on student outcomes, but 
there is no substantial link between school performance and funding decisions.  
Performance budgeting policies are those where the state collects performance data 
and the legislature/funding agency considers it when crafting the budget, but where 
there are no formally specified benchmarks that result in automatic 
increases/decreases in financial support.  The strongest accountability policies, 
39 
termed performance funding, are those where some portion (often times a small 
percentage) of institutional funding is directly linked to the achievement of 
performance indicators (Burke 2002). 
 Within this classification, performance funding policies have been the most 
controversial.  Those in favor of performance funding lament the lack of external 
pressure on institutions to improve student outcomes and have emphasized the 
importance of using outcome measures to incentivize improved institutional 
performance (Aldeman and Carey 2009; Burke and Minassians 2003; Kelly, 
Schneider, and Carey 2010).  On the other hand, some have pointed out that 
performance funding could potentially result in a narrow focus on a small number 
of indicators, which could cause institutions to dilute the quality of education via 
grade inflation in order to improve their scores (and thus their budgets) (Hunt 2008; 
Wellman 2001; Zumeta 2001).   
 Performance funding policies spread rapidly during the late 1990s and early 
2000s, but experienced a lull starting in the mid-2000s.  The motivations behind 
adopting these policies have been traced to several key factors.  McLendon, Hearn, 
and Deaton (2006) find that many of the factors that made NPM reforms successful 
in other policy areas, and  the adoption of accountability mechanisms in K-12 
education (particularly with regards to No Child Left Behind) helped contribute to 
the adoption of performance funding policies  in many states.  
Despite their popularity during the last decade, performance funding 
policies have also proven to be somewhat unstable, with several states quickly 
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abandoning these policies soon after they were adopted (Dougherty, Natow, and 
Blanca 2012).  Many states adopted policies that only tied bonus money directly to 
performance, and thus fiscal constraints caused by economic recessions eliminated 
the funding base from which performance money was drawn (Burke and 
Minassians 2003; Dougherty and Natow 2009).  Other causes of declining 
popularity of performance funding include a lack of support from the higher 
education community, lackluster involvement of the private sector and business 
leaders, and political turnover that replaced former champions of performance 
funding with new leaders that were not interested in maintaining a long-term 
commitment to these policies (Dougherty and Natow 2009). 
During the last two years, however, performance funding has resurged as a 
prominent reform proposal.  In 2009, Complete College America, a non-profit 
advocacy organization, formed and began to lobby state governments to adopt a 
series of higher education reforms.  These efforts focused on re-organizing 
governance structures, improving remediation, and increasing the role of 
performance data in budgeting and strategic planning activities (Complete College 
America 2010b).  As of November, 2010, 24 states have pledged to incorporate 
core principles from the CCA agenda, which includes a strong push towards 
performance funding, into their public systems of higher education (Complete 
College America 2010a).     
This paper empirically examines two aspects of the debate about 
performance funding in higher education that have currently received little attention 
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in the literature.  First, how effective have performance funding policies been at 
reforming state budgets?  Underlying the causal logic behind performance funding 
is the belief that organizations will respond to changes in the funding environment 
by adopting new strategies and techniques to improve performance.  If this 
assumption is correct, then performance funding policies must have a meaningful 
impact on the level of support that institutions receive from state governments, net 
of other influences (such as the health of the economy or other factors that limit the 
amount of money that states have to spend on higher education).  This paper 
explores whether the adoption of performance funding strengthens the link between 
student outcomes and state appropriations, as proponents suggest, or whether these 
policies have been more symbolic with regards to budgetary impacts.   
Second, this paper seeks to understand whether stronger accountability 
mechanisms influence the way that institutions allocate resources.  In recent years, 
many universities have sought to expand their capacity to conduct research, partly 
because doing so increases their ability to secure attractive funding, but also 
because research output is often times associated with higher levels of prestige and 
reputation (Archibald and Feldman 2008a; Gansemer-Topf and Schuh 2006; 
Grunig 1997; Robst 2001; Ryan 2004).  Those concerned about student outcomes 
and cost containment, however, argue that overly focusing on research at the 
expense of instructional activities is problematic because often times these research 
endeavors do not actively involve or affect undergraduate education (Weisbrod, 
Ballou, and Asch 2008).  Thus, some see research as a distraction that public 
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institutions, particularly those with low student achievement, should focus on less 
heavily.  If accountability policies are successful in altering the focus of institutions 
away from certain activities (such as research) and towards others (such as 
instruction), then we ought to observe differences in university expenditures on 
these activities when comparing schools in states with funding policies versus those 
in states without them.   
Figure 3.1: Causal Logic of Performance Funding Policies 
 
The causal logic that underlies performance accountability mechanisms 
(Figure 3.1) implies that incentives will be restructured in a way that results in 
changes in management that are geared towards improving performance with 
respect to client outcomes.  Unfortunately, much of the research that examines the 
impacts of these policies, particularly in the area of higher education, skips the 
intermediate links in the causal chain and focuses exclusively on whether the 
adoption of performance policies result in improved student success.  As a result, 
we have some limited information about whether accountability policies were 
successful in bringing about improved performance (Volkwein and Tandberg 
2008), but we have very limited systematic analysis that can tell us why (or why 
not).  If we are to understand anything about why these policies work or do not 
work, we must begin by understanding whether they are successful in changing the 
incentive structures that public managers face.  If they are unsuccessful in doing so, 
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then the causal logic of performance management breaks down, and the desired 
impacts are unlikely to be realized. 
Data 
 The empirical component of this paper proceeds in two stages.  In stage one 
I examine the link between performance information and the amount of money that 
public universities receive from state governments.  In stage two I explore the 
impact of performance funding policies on institutional behavior.  In both stages, I 
rely on data that is publicly reported in the Integrated Postsecondary Education 
Data System (IPEDS) for institutional indicators.   
State Policies for Performance Funding 
In keeping with Burke’s framework, I define states as having adopted a 
performance funding policy if they directly and formulaically tie state 
appropriations to institutional performance with respect to student outcomes.  In 
order to identify which states have adopted performance funding policies (and 
when these policies were adopted), I consulted a variety of sources, including 
reports by academics and policy think tanks (Burke and Serban 1998; Aldeman and 
Carey 2009; Dougherty et al. 2010) and source documents from state governments.  
Because I am interested in the effect that these policies have on appropriations, I 
code policies as starting when they are first funded, rather than when the 
legislature, governor, or coordinating board adopted a plan to implement 
performance funding at some point in the future.  In a few instances there were 
conflicts between some of my sources regarding the content and adoption dates for  
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Table 3.1: Summary of Performance Funding Policies  
State Years Policy In Effect Performance Indicators 
Arkansas 1994-1996 
(First funded in 1995) 
Graduation rates, retention, minority graduation 
rates, minority retention, licensure pass rates, exit 
exams, administrative costs, faculty teaching load, 
student body diversity, faculty diversity, alumni 
and employer surveys 
   
Arkansas 2008-Present Number credit hours enrolled at the beginning of 
the term, number of course completions 
   
Colorado 1993-Present 
(First funded in 1994) 
Graduation rates, retention, minority student 
success, pass rates of graduates on technical 
exams, institutional support/ administrative 
expenditures per full-time student, class size, 
number of credits required for degree, faculty 
instructional workload, and two institution specific 
measures 
   
Indiana 2007-Present Graduation rates, bachelor’s degrees produced, 
degree completion for low-income students, 
research productivity 
   
Kansas 1999-Present Indicators are specific to each institution (and are 
largely selected by the institutions), includes 
things such as graduation rates, retention, student 
body diversity, graduates’ scores on learning 
assessment exams, minority student outcomes, 
participation in study abroad programs, faculty 
credentials, and external research grants. 
   
Kentucky 1996-1997 Graduation rates, retention 
   
Kentucky 2007 (Suspended after 1 
year due to budget cuts) 
Degree production per FTE, minority student 
degree production, one indicator of choice 
(includes graduation rates, student learning 
assessments, transfer credits, and other indicators) 
   
Louisiana 2008-Present Number of degree completers, minority student 
degree completers, number of completers in 
STEM fields 
   
Minnesota 1995-1997 
(First funded in 1996) 
Graduation rates, retention, ranking of incoming 
freshmen, minority student enrollment 
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Missouri 1991-2002 
(First funded in 1993) 
Graduation rates, bachelor’s degrees produced, 
bachelor’s degrees produced for minority students, 
scores of graduates on national exams  
   
New Jersey 1999-2002 Graduation rates, cost efficiency, and 
diversification of revenues. 
   
New Mexico 2005-Present 
(First funded in 2007) 
Graduation rates, retention, and research 
productivity (for research universities only) 
   
Ohio 1998-Present Primarily focused on external research grants 
awarded and tuition, but also contains indicators 
for time to degree, and degree completion among 
at-risk students 
   
Oklahoma 1997-Present 
(Suspended in 2001) 
Graduation rates and retention 




2000-Present Indicators broken into 4 categories: 1) Student 
Achievement and Success, 2) University and 
System Excellence, 3) Commonwealth Service, 4) 
Resource Development and stewardship.  
Indicators include graduation rates, retention, 
bachelor’s degrees awarded, faculty diversity, 
faculty productivity, student to faculty ratio, and 
cost per FTE student 
   
South Carolina 1996-2004 Total of 37 indicators, broken into nine categories: 
1) Graduate’s achievements, 2) Quality of faculty, 
3) Instructional quality, 4) Institutional 
cooperation and collaboration, 5) Administrative 
efficiency, 6) Entrance requirements, 7) Mission 
focus, 8) User friendliness, and 9) Research 
funding.  Indicators include graduation rates, 
faculty teaching and research credentials, student 
to teacher ratios, administrative cost efficiency, 
SAT/ACT scores of entering freshmen, and 
external research grants awarded 
   
Tennessee 1979-Present Several indicators separated into 4 major 
categories 1) Student learning and access, 2) 
Student, alumni and employer surveys, 3) 
Achievement of state master plan priorities, and 4) 
assessment outcomes.  Indicators and benchmarks 
are updated and revised on 5 year cycles.   
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  Graduation rates, retention, minority student 
enrollment, and scores on learning assessment 
tests are generally among the major indicators.   
   
Texas 1999-2003 Number of students defined as unprepared for 
college who successfully complete remedial 
coursework 
   
Virginia 2005-Present Retention, access for underprivileged populations, 
tuition, external research grants, contribution to 
economic development 
   
Washington 1997-1998 Graduation rates, retention, undergraduate 
efficiency (ratio of credits taken to credits needed 
to graduate), faculty productivity, plus one unique 
indicator for each university 
 
performance funding policies; in these cases I contacted staff members from the 
state agency responsible for higher education policy to inform coding decisions.  
Information about the adoption dates and content of these policies is listed in table 
one. 
 Although the content of performance funding policies varies significantly 
across the states, there are also a number of notable trends.  The most common 
indicator that states use in measuring performance is graduation rates (15 of 20 
policies), followed by retention (9), student outcomes for minority or low-income 
students (6), number of degrees produced (5), various measures of cost-efficiency 
(5), research productivity and external funding for research (5), student or faculty 
diversity (4), and student pass rates on exit exams, licensure tests, or national 
learning assessment exams (4).  These findings are generally consistent with earlier 
studies of performance funding indicators (Burke 2001). 
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Stage One – Does Performance Funding Make Appropriations More 
Outcomes Oriented? 
In stage one, the amount of money that a university received in state 
appropriations, measured in constant dollars, is the dependent variable.  
Traditionally, higher education has been financed primarily in terms of inputs, such 
as the number of students enrolled or the number of credit hours that students take, 
so I include several independent variables that measure inputs in my stage one 
model.  First, I include measures for the number of undergraduate and graduate 
students enrolled at the university, with the expectation that each will be positively 
related to state appropriations.  I also include several indicators for at-risk or 
vulnerable student populations, such as traditionally under-represented racial 
minorities or students from low income socio-economic backgrounds.  These 
include percent of students who are Black, percent of students who are Hispanic, 
and the percent of students who receive federal grant aid, which I employ as a 
measure for low income.  In addition to these input measures, I also include a 
number of variables that focus on research productivity (measured by the amount 
of money that the institution received in grants and contracts), selectivity (as 
measured by Barron’s selector rating1), and statewide support of higher education 
(total state spending on higher education per full-time equivalent student).   Aside 
from selectivity, all of these measures, in addition to the dependent variable are 
reported by the IPEDS, and I have valid data for years spanning from 1998 to 2009.  
                                                 
1 Barron’s selector rating is based on a combination of SAT/ACT scores and the percent of 
applicants who are accepted.  It ranges from Non-Competitive to Most Competitive. 
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Because I am interested in the impact that these measures have on state budgets, 
and because there is often a delay between when this information is collected 
versus when it is reported publicly, I have lagged all of the independent variables 
by one year (and my dataset thus spans the 1999-2009 time period). Descriptive 
statistics for stage 1 are listed in table 3.2 
Table 3.2: Summary Statistics (Stage One) 
 Mean Std. Min Max 
State Appropriations (in $ Millions) 101.8 114.5 3.11 696.0 
State Higher Ed. Spending Per FTE (const. $1000s) 6.83 1.44 2.95 13.7 
Non-Competitive (Barron's) 0.091 0.29 0 1 
Less Competitive (Barron's) 0.17 0.38 0 1 
Competitive (Barron's) 0.48 0.50 0 1 
Very Competitive (Barron's) 0.19 0.39 0 1 
Highly Competitive (Barron's) 0.06 0.24 0 1 
Most Competitive (Barron's) 0.012 0.11 0 1 
Gifts, Grants, and Contr. Per Enroll. (const. $1000s) 6.77 8.01 0.59 71.5 
Undergraduate Enrollment (1000s) 11.2 7.87 0.77 53.3 
Graduate Enrollment (1000s) 2.60 2.64 0 15.0 
Percent Receiving Federal Aid 31.1 14.8 2 90 
Percent Black Students 12.7 19.3 0.14 97.8 
Percent Hispanic Students 6.25 10.6 0 88.5 
Graduation Rates (Latest available info) 46.9 16.0 2.53 100 
Retention Rate 74.3 10.2 16 97 
Bachelor's Degrees Produced Per Enrollment 0.17 0.043 0.023 0.30 
Performance Funding 0.21 0.41 0 1 
 
 I also employ several variables that measure university performance with 
respect to student outcomes.  First, I include the six-year (150% of normal time) 
graduation rate.  This variable is constructed by taking the revised cohort 
(removing students who die, are deployed for military service, are part-time, etc.) 
and counting the number of students who earned a degree within six years of 
entering college.  For example, graduation rates for 2009 indicate the percentage of 
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students who entered as first-time full-time freshmen in the fall of 2003 that had 
earned a degree by the fall of 2009. Though not a perfect measure of performance, 
graduation rates have become an increasingly popular indicator amongst those who 
advocate the need for performance funding, and is the metric most often used in 
these accountability policies.  I have valid data for this measure for the 1991-2003 
cohorts.  As with the other independent variables, I have lagged this measure one 
year from when the cohort graduated (or 7 years from when students enrolled as 
freshmen).   
In addition to graduation rates, I also include measures for one-year student 
retention (the percentage of students who return for their sophomore year) and 
bachelor’s degrees awarded per enrollment, as these are other popular indicators 
that states employ to track student outcomes.  As was the case with graduation 
rates, these variables are lagged one year.  Because these three variables are 
strongly correlated with one another, and because the years for which I have valid 
data for each of them differ (IPEDS did not begin collecting retention rates until 
2003), I run separate models for each, in addition to a combined model with all of 
them included.  
 Finally, while I include a measure for whether or not a state had a 
performance funding policy, this variable is, taken on its own, relatively 
meaningless given the other independent variables that are included in the model.  
Instead, I am primarily interested in interaction terms for this variable and various 
measures of performance.  If performance funding policies are effective at causing 
50 
university appropriations to be based more on student outcomes and less on inputs, 
then the coefficient for the interaction between performance funding and the 
outcome variables (graduation rates, retention, and degree production) will be 
positive and statistically significant, while the interactions of performance funding 
and the two enrollment indicators will be negative and statistically significant.  
Further, while most performance funding policies are primarily driven by a concern 
about student outcomes, some states have also used measures of student diversity, 
selectivity, and research productivity as dimensions of performance that institutions 
are rewarded for improving, so I also include interactions for performance funding 
with these variables. 
My dataset includes all public four-year degree-granting institutions with a 
Carnegie classification of bachelor’s or higher (excluding military academies and 
universities located in Washington D.C.), with data from multiple years for each 
university.  When dealing with data that have both cross-sectional and time-series 
components such as these, one must be careful to address potential problems with 
serial auto-correlation and heteroskedasticity between panels (Greene 2003; 
Wooldridge 2002).  Thus, in both stages, I follow the advice of Beck and Katz 
(1995) and employ panel corrected standard errors (PCSEs) with panel-specific 
corrections for AR1 autocorrelation.  
The stage one model can be written as: 
Yit = α + βStateSpendingit + βSelectivityit-1 + βResearchit-1+ 
βUndergradit-1 + βGraduateit-1 + βPercBlackit-1 + βPercHispanicit-1+ 
βPercAidit-1+ βGradRateit-7 + βRetentionit-1 + βDegreesit-1 + 
βPFundingit + βPFunding*Performanceit-1 + ϵit 
51 
 
where Yit is the amount of funding that an institution received in appropriations at 
time t, α is the constant, StateSpendingst is the amount of money that a state 
appropriated for higher education in year t, Selectivityit-1 is a set of variables to 
reflect institutional competitiveness, and PFunding*Performance represents a 
vector for the interaction terms for performance funding and each dimension of 
performance, and ϵit is the error term.   
Stage One – Findings 
 Figure 3.2 provides an exploratory look at the variation that exists amongst 
the states when it comes to the relationship between funding and performance. 
Each dot represents an individual institution within a given state, and the lines 
show bi-variate regression slopes of graduation rates on state appropriations.  
Observations in years where states have adopted performance funding are grey, 
while those in years without performance funding are black, Although one should 
be cautious about drawing overly strong conclusions from this display alone, 
particularly given the lack of controls for confounding variables, there does not 
seem to be a very strong pattern in terms of performance funding states having 
markedly closer connections between student outcomes (at least in terms of 
graduation rates) and appropriations.  Further, in many cases where states had a 
policy for some of the years but not all of them, there appears to be almost no 
difference in the strength of the relationship between performance and  
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Figure 3.2: Exploring the Relationship Between Performance and Funding by 
State 
 
institutional funding.  With this in mind, I now turn to more sophisticated 
multivariate analysis of my stage one model in order to better understand the 
factors that shape state appropriations. 
 Results for stage one are listed in table 3.3, and there are several important 
findings.  As stated earlier, I ran four models in total (one for each student outcome 
variable separately, and one combined model with all of the outcome variables). In 




Table 3.3: Stage One Results (DV = State Appropriations (in constant $ 
Millions) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
State Higher Ed. Spending Per FTE  9.159*** 10.479*** 9.264*** 10.179*** 
            (constant $1000s) (0.44) (0.69) (0.45) (0.60) 
Undergraduate Enrollment (1000s) 7.382*** 7.315*** 7.519*** 7.004*** 
 (0.34) (0.38) (0.36) (0.37) 
Graduate Enrollment (1000s) 8.666*** 7.542*** 8.601*** 7.703*** 
 (0.96) (1.12) (1.02) (1.05) 
Less Competitive (Barron's) 1.526 5.285** 1.611 1.970 
 (1.60) (2.01) (1.55) (2.04) 
Competitive (Barron's) -3.821* -2.119 -2.472 -5.253* 
 (1.69) (2.15) (1.58) (2.32) 
Very Competitive (Barron's) 6.069* 6.715* 7.421** 2.247 
 (2.67) (3.28) (2.45) (3.36) 
Highly Competitive (Barron's) 13.632** 7.898 15.309*** 2.704 
 (4.93) (6.28) (4.63) (6.15) 
Most Competitive (Barron's) 54.003** 79.143*** 59.715*** 70.847*** 
 (18.67) (19.37) (17.65) (19.55) 
Gifts, Grants, and Contracts Per  4.721*** 5.072*** 4.781*** 4.918*** 
        Enrollment  (constant $1000s)  (0.28) (0.34) (0.26) (0.34) 
% Students Receiving Federal Aid 0.090* 0.110* 0.084* 0.198*** 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) 
% Black Students -0.121*** -0.132*** -0.104*** -0.098** 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
% Hispanic Students -0.583*** -0.721*** -0.667*** -0.695*** 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) 
Grad. Rates (Latest available info) 0.365***   0.257*** 
 (0.06)   (0.07) 
Retention Rate  0.229**  -0.037 
  (0.07)  (0.06) 
Bachelor's Degrees Produced Per    131.567*** 125.882*** 
          Enrollment   (18.36) (17.63) 
Performance Funding 8.574+ 8.107 9.984+ 8.176 
 (4.49) (10.59) (5.96) (9.95) 
Performance Funding * Und. Enroll  1.322*** 1.183* 1.331*** 0.971+ 
 (0.38) (0.50) (0.39) (0.50) 
Performance Funding * Grad. Enroll -2.506+ -2.093 -2.497+ -1.790 
 (1.28) (1.86) (1.34) (1.89) 
Performance Funding * Gifts, Grants,  -1.115* -1.372+ -1.235** -1.195 
          & Contracts (0.48) (0.70) (0.46) (0.73) 
Performance Funding * Less  1.918 3.798 1.646 2.335 
             Competitive (2.56) (2.98) (2.51) (3.02) 
Performance Funding * Competitive 7.332** 10.393** 5.344+ 9.139** 
 (2.82) (3.28) (2.78) (3.45) 
Performance Funding * Very  4.274 3.034 1.538 5.447 
         Competitive (4.39) (4.81) (4.37) (4.86) 
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Performance Funding * Highly  -5.417 -8.895 -8.905 -0.061 
                Competitive (7.69) (10.89) (7.72) (10.27) 
Performance Funding * Most    -22.411 -71.766* -20.922 -75.237* 
                 Competitive (27.99) (32.13) (25.72) (33.36) 
Performance Funding * % Rec. Fed  -0.134* -0.096 -0.128* -0.185* 
                  Aid (0.05) (0.08) (0.05) (0.08) 
Performance Funding * % Black 0.172*** 0.088 0.177*** 0.092 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) 
Performance Funding * % Hispanic 0.226*** 0.248** 0.293*** 0.291*** 
 (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.08) 
Performance Funding * Grad. Rate -0.307***   -0.211+ 
 (0.08)   (0.12) 
Performance Funding * Retention Rate  -0.186  0.046 
  (0.16)  (0.14) 
Performance Funding * Deg. Per Enr.   -85.386** -31.335 
   (32.02) (43.35) 
Constant -106.12*** -119.73*** -114.52*** -126.26*** 
 (4.93) (6.75) (5.53) (6.88) 
# of Observations 3327 2280 3386 2273 
# of Universities 423 398 425 397 
Years Covered 1999-2009 2003-2009 1999-2009 2003-2009 
Wald χ2 4168.83*** 4791.36*** 4085.96*** 5641.07*** 
R2 0.878 0.926 0.883 0.935 
Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
consistent across all four models, however because these models incorporate 
different time spans, and because some of the student outcome variables are highly 
correlated with each other, some of the effects in the first three models are no 
longer statistically significant in model four.   
First, In terms of performance information, there is a positive and 
statistically significant relationship between the latest information on each measure 
of student outcomes and state appropriations (though for retention this effect does 
not persist in the combined model).  Note that because of the interaction terms, 
these values represent the relationship between various metrics of performance and 
appropriations in states that do not have performance funding policies.  Given the 
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extent to which proponents of performance funding bemoan the lack of incentives 
for improving student outcomes, this point is quite meaningful for substantive 
debates regarding the need for dramatic reforms in funding mechanisms for public 
universities.  Even in states without performance funding, there is a positive and 
statistically significant relationship between performance information regarding 
student outcomes and institutional funding.   
Second, as expected, highly productive research universities and selective 
institutions receive considerably more in state appropriations than their peers.  With 
regard to enrollments, both undergraduate and graduate enrollments are positively 
related to the amount of money that institutions receive from state governments.  
For undergraduate enrollments, the effect ranges from $7.0 million to $7.5 million 
per each additional 1,000 students, while a similar increase in the number of 
graduate students yields an expected increase of $7.7 million to $8.7 million.  With 
respect to disadvantaged student populations, the relationships between both the 
percent of students who are Black and  the percent of students who are Hispanic 
and state appropriations are negative and statistically significant in all four models.  
Every 1% increase in Black students is associated with $98,000 to $132,000 less in 
state appropriations, while a similar increase in the percentage of Hispanic students 
yields an expected $583,000 to $721,000 drop in state support. For percent of 
students receiving financial aid, however, the coefficient is positive and statistically 
significant in all four models. 
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Turning now to the interaction terms, there are some conflicting results.  
The interaction for performance undergraduate enrollment is positive and 
significant in all four models, while the term for performance funding and graduate 
enrollment is negative statistically significant in two of the models (models 1 and 
3).  As expected, this implies that states with performance funding actually place 
greater emphasis on undergraduate enrollments than non-performance states when 
allocating resources to public universities.  Similarly, the interaction terms for 
percent Black and percent Hispanic are also positive and generally significant, 
which implies that performance funding states are indeed providing some rewards 
to institutions that increase student diversity. 
With respect to other metrics of performance, however, my findings suggest 
that performance funding policies have generally been ineffective.  First, note that 
the interaction for performance funding and research revenues are negative and 
statistically significant in three of the four models, indicating that many of the 
states with these policies are less likely to reward highly productive research 
institutions than their peers.  With regards to performance funding and institutional 
selectivity,  there is a positive interaction for schools that are classified as 
competitive (the midpoint on Barron’s selectivity scale), the effect is reversed with 
those that are most selective.  Finally, the interaction terms for graduation rates, 
retention, and degree production and performance funding are all either 
insignificant or significant and negative, which suggests that, contrary to what 
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proponents argue, states with performance funding actually have a somewhat 
weaker link between student outcomes and institutional funding.   
The negative and statistically significant coefficients for the interactions 
between performance funding and graduation rates bachelor’s degree production is 
particularly surprising given the amount of attention that these policies have 
received from those who favor outcome-based accountability.  One possible 
explanation for this unexpected result is that states adopt these policies when they 
perceive that public revenues are not being utilized appropriately, but that the 
policies themselves are ineffective in terms of dramatically changing the budget 
process.  
Another possibility is that less formal mechanisms may be more powerful in 
shaping state budgets.  A closer examination of the relationship between state 
legislators, particularly those who sit on committees responsible for allocating 
resources to higher education, and university campuses may be a useful starting 
place to gain leverage on this topic.  For example, McLendon, Hearn, and Mokher 
(2009) find a positive link between appropriations to research universities within a 
state and the number of alumni from these institutions that are members of the state 
legislature.  They argue that legislators tend to “privilege” institutions that they 
have close ties to, and it may be the case that performance funding policies are 
simply unable to overcome these political biases.  Regardless of the reasons for 
their ineffectiveness, it appears that performance funding policies have not been 
successful in transforming state budgets when it comes to higher education.   
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Stage Two – Do Performance Funding Policies Influence University Priorities? 
 In stage two, I move from considering the impacts of performance funding 
on state policymakers to understanding how they influence individual institutions.  
To do so, I rely on a set of measures that indicate the percentage of education 
related expenditures2 that are allocated to research and instruction.  As previously 
discussed, some observers have argued that research and undergraduate instruction 
are competing tasks, and many worry that heightened emphasis on research will 
have negative impacts for student outcomes.  Given the fact that student outcomes 
(graduation rates in particular) play a central role in virtually every performance 
funding scheme, one might expect that universities located in performance funding 
states will spend less on research and more on instruction than they otherwise 
would.  On the other hand, despite much of the strong rhetoric that has often pitted 
research against instruction, some performance funding states actually adopted 
policies that encourage research productivity in addition to undergraduate 
education (though the findings from stage one indicate that they have not 
effectively done so).  This would suggest that performance funding policies might 
lead institutions to shift more resources to research.  Finally, given the multitude of 
other factors that influence institutional budgets, it may be the case that 
performance funding policies have little to no effect on institutional spending in 
either direction.  Descriptive statistics for stage two are listed in table four. 
                                                 
2 Total education related expenditures include money allocated to the following activities: 
Instruction, Research, Academic Support, Student Services, Public service, Institutional Support, 
and Expenditures for Scholarships and Grants. 
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 I use several independent variables to predict the amount of money that 
institutions spend on research and instruction.  First, I include measures for both 
total enrollment and the percentage of students who are enrolled as undergraduates.  
Because graduate education is often geared towards the production of research, 
with many students working as research assistants, while undergraduate education 
is primarily focused on teaching and instruction, I expect that universities with a 
larger percentage of undergraduate students will expend more money on 
instruction, and less on research.    
Table 3.4: Summary Statistics (Stage Two) 
 Mean Std. Min Max 
% Expenditures on Research 7.44 10.34 0 74.48 
% Expenditures on Instruction 45.11 8.09 1.55 93.87 
Non-Competitive (Barron's) 0.11 0.31 0 1 
Less Competitive (Barron's) 0.21 0.40 0 1 
Competitive (Barron's) 0.46 0.50 0 1 
Very Competitive (Barron's) 0.15 0.35 0 1 
Highly Competitive (Barron's) 0.05 0.21 0 1 
Most Competitive (Barron's) 0.01 0.09 0 1 
Bachelor's (Carnegie) 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Master's (Carnegie) 0.47 0.50 0 1 
Research (Carnegie) 0.30 0.46 0 1 
Total Enrollment (1000s) 11 9.80 0.18 68.06 
% Undergraduate 85.19 11.27 0.07 100 
% of Students Receiving Federal Aid 33.94 16.33 0 100 
% of Students who are Part-Time 24 15.72 0.13 96.80 
% Full-Time Faculty 65.45 18.24 0.66 100 
Performance Funding 0.15 0.36 0 1 
 
I also include a set of measures for institutional selectivity (the same 
Barron’s selectivity measure that was employed in stage one) and mission (as 
measured by Carnegie classification), with the expectation that more selective 
institutions and those that are classified as research universities will spend a larger 
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percentage of their resources on research activities, while teaching institutions 
(those classified as either Bachelor’s degree granting or Master’s degree granting) 
will spend more on instruction.  Further, I include measures for the percentage of 
students who are part-time and the percentage who receive federal aid.  Because 
these students are generally the most vulnerable, in terms of their risk to drop out of 
school before they complete a degree, I expect that these variables will be 
positively related to institutional expenditures on instruction.  Finally, in addition to 
student demographics, I also include a measure for the percentage of faculty who 
are full-time employees with 9/10 month equated contracts, with the expectation 
that a higher percentage of faculty members who are full-time will be positively 
related to research and negatively related to instruction. 
As was the case with stage one, I use panel corrected standard errors with 
panel specific AR1 terms to correct for autocorrelation within panels and 
heteroskedasticity between panels.  My stage two models can be written as: 
Yit = α + βSelectivityit + βMissionit+ βEnrollmentit + 
βPercUndergradit + βPercAidit+ βPercPartTStudentsit + 
βPercFullTFacit + βPFundingit + ϵit 
 
where Yit is the percent of expenditures on instruction or research for an institution 
at time t, α is the constant term, Selectivityit is a set of variables to reflect 
institutional competitiveness, Missionit is a vector of variables to reflect Carnegie 
classification, PFundingit represents a dichotomous variable for whether an 
institution was subject to a performance funding policy at time t, and ϵit is the error 
term.  
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Stage Two – Findings 
 Results for stage two are listed in Table 3.5.  Turning first to the percentage 
of expenditures on research, there are a number of interesting findings.  As 
expected, total enrollment is positively related to the research expenditures, and 
every 10,000 student increase in total enrollment is associated with a 0.89 
percentage point increase in expenditures on research.  Similarly, institutions that 
are classified as highly or most competitive spend 1.90 and 1.71 percentage points 
more on research than their non-competitive peers, while Research and Doctoral 
degree granting universities spend 14.78 percentage points more than those 
classified as baccalaureate colleges.  Conversely, the percentage of students who 
are undergraduates is negatively related to research spending, and every 10 
percentage point increase in undergraduate students yields a 0.77 percentage point 
decrease in research expenditures.  A similar increase in the percentage of students 
who are part-time is associated with a 0.61 percentage point decrease.  With regard 
to the variable of interest, performance funding is negatively related to research 
expenditures, and institutions located in states with performance funding policies 
spend 0.34 percentage points less of their educational expenditures on research than 
they would, all else equal, in non-performance funding states. 
 In terms of instructional expenditures, similar patterns emerge.  Somewhat 
surprisingly, competitive and very competitive institutions spend more on 
instruction than do those on either end of the selectivity scale.  Research and 
Doctoral degree granting universities spend 4.13 percentage points less on  
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Table 3.5: Stage Two Results 
 % Expend. on Research % Expend. on Instruct. 
Less Competitive (Barron's) -0.178 0.429 
 (0.17) (0.29) 
Competitive (Barron's) -0.158 0.688* 
 (0.17) (0.27) 
Very Competitive (Barron's) 0.283 1.040** 
 (0.25) (0.33) 
Highly Competitive (Barron's) 1.904*** 0.364 
 (0.40) (0.58) 
Most Competitive (Barron's) 1.710** 0.097 
 (0.61) (0.73) 
Master's (Carnegie) -1.426*** 2.183*** 
 (0.36) (0.47) 
Research (Carnegie) 14.779*** -4.134*** 
 (0.62) (0.80) 
Total Enrollment (1000s) 0.089*** -0.028 
 (0.02) (0.03) 
% Undergraduate -0.077*** -0.011 
 (0.01) (0.02) 
% of Students Receiving Federal Aid 0.003 -0.041*** 
 (0.00) (0.01) 
% of Students who are Part-Time -0.061*** 0.007 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
% Full-Time Faculty -0.006 -0.012+ 
 (0.00) (0.01) 
Performance Funding -0.342** 0.890*** 
 (0.12) (0.21) 
Constant 11.062*** 47.393*** 
 (1.47) (2.07) 
# of Observations 5490 5490 
# of Universities 490 490 
Years Covered 1998-2009 1998-2009 
Wald χ2 6673.57*** 688.64*** 
R2 0.786 0.943 
Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
instruction than do other schools, while institutions classified as Master’s degree 
granting spend 2.18 percentage points more on instruction than do Bachelor’s 
degree only granting schools.  Similarly, as the percentage of faculty who are full-
time and the percentage of students who receive federal financial aid increase, 
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expenditures on instruction decrease.  Finally, performance funding is positively 
related to the proportion of expenditures that are allocated to instruction, with 
institutions in performance funding states spending about 0.89 percentage points 
more on instruction than those in non-performance states, all else equal. 
 While performance funding policies appear to work in the desired direction 
for both expenditures and instruction, the effects are minimal.  In both instances, 
the differences between institutions with performance funding versus those without 
is less than 1 percentage point. Given the previously discussed findings that 
indicate little effect of accountability policies on state budgets (and thus 
institutional incentives), it is perhaps unsurprising that we observe such minimal 
effects when examining institutional priorities.  As state governments are 
increasingly incapable of subsidizing higher education in the same capacity as has 
traditionally been the case (Mumper 2003; Weerts and Ronca 2006), public 
universities have come to rely more and more on private sources of revenue 
(including competition for research funding).  Nevertheless, given that current 
performance funding efforts have largely been ineffective at reshaping state 
budgets, the fact that these policies have had even minimal impacts on institutional 
spending is a notable and somewhat surprising finding.  These results leave open 
the potential for these policies to have considerable effects on administrative 
behavior if policymakers could more effectively tie larger incentives to institutional 
performance. 
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 One important question that remains about the influence of performance 
funding policies on institutional behavior is whether or not there are differential 
impacts.  Given that large research universities are often times considerably more 
visible than non-research universities, one might speculate that performance 
funding policies would have a greater impact on their priorities.  On the other hand, 
these institutions have greater access to outside revenues, and are often times 
portrayed as less reliant on state funding than other institutions in their state 
(Ehrenberg 2006).  Thus performance funding policies on spending priorities could 
also conceivably less influential for research universities than other institutions.  
In order to test whether the influence of performance funding was different 
based on institutional mission, I re-ran the analysis from stage two separately for 
research institutions versus non-research institutions (tables 3.6 and 3.7).  In both 
cases, it appears that the effect of performance funding policies is greater for 
research universities than it is for non-research universities.  In the case of 
expenditures on research, performance funding policies have a negative and 
statistically significant influence on institutional spending, but they are not 
significant in the model for non-research universities.  For instruction, performance 
funding policies are positive and statistically significant in both cases, but the 
magnitude of the effect for research universities is more than double that for non-
research institutions (1.34 versus 0.59).  While performance funding policies are 
generally aimed at all public institutions in a state, it appears that they may be more 
influential on research universities. 
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Table 3.6: Differential Impacts of Performance Funding on Percent of 
Expenditures on Instruction: Research versus Non-Research Universities 




Less Competitive (Barron's)  0.702* -0.715+ 
  (0.36) (0.43) 
Competitive (Barron's)  0.848* -0.093 
  (0.34) (0.38) 
Very Competitive (Barron's)  1.949*** -0.179 
  (0.43) (0.45) 
Highly Competitive (Barron's)  2.182** -1.043 
  (0.82) (0.74) 
Most Competitive (Barron's)  1.750 -1.308 
  (1.72) (0.84) 
Total Enrollment (1000s)  0.200*** -0.154** 
  (0.03) (0.05) 
% Undergraduate  0.003 -0.080+ 
  (0.02) (0.04) 
% of Students Rec. Federal Aid  -0.053*** -0.002 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
% of Students who are Part-Time  -0.021+ 0.020 
  (0.01) (0.03) 
% Full-Time Faculty  0.002 -0.017 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
Performance Funding  0.586* 1.343*** 
  (0.24) (0.33) 
Constant  45.928*** 51.694*** 
  (1.71) (4.66) 
# of Observations  3599 1891 
# of Universities  327 163 
Years Covered  1998-2009 1998-2009 
Wald χ2  227.75*** 99.35*** 
R2  0.946 0.931 
Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Conclusion and Discussion 
 Overall, the results from both stage one and stage two failed to find any 
substantial evidence that performance funding policies have had significant impacts 
on state budgets or institutional priorities.  One interesting finding that has 
implications for both the performance management literature and the broader 
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literature on performance and public organizations is that the link between 
performance information and funding may already be more substantial than many 
observers are currently aware.  Performance funding policies are largely based on 
the premise that university administrators do not currently place enough emphasis 
on student outcomes, because they have few incentives to do so.  This analysis 
finds that institutions do face meaningful financial incentives for improving 
performance, and that performance funding policies have done little (if anything) to 
make these incentives any more powerful than they already are.   
Moreover, Zhang (2009) found that state appropriations have a positive 
impact on institutional graduation rates, so it may be the case that most institutions 
are already highly concerned with student outcomes and that they simply need 
more resources from state governments in order to produce results.  If this is the 
case, then a shift towards funding policies that effectively punish those institutions 
that are underperforming may actually work to undercut progress towards 
improving student outcomes and alleviating achievement gaps.  Rather than 
responding with desired shifts in administrative priorities (i.e. smaller class sizes 
and more full-time faculty who are heavily involved in undergraduate education), 
institutions may instead react to these policies by simply raising admissions criteria 
and reducing access for at-risk students (Fryar 2011). 
Second, while performance funding policies do not appear to have 
dramatically altered institutional spending priorities, it is interesting to note that 
they had some minimal influence.  If these policies do not effectively restructure 
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financial incentives (as the findings from stage one indicate), why do institutions 
respond to them at all?  One explanation may be that university administrators 
perceive that accountability policies will potentially have a major impact on their 
institutions at some point in the near future, even if they are not very effective right 
now.   Given the highly charged political rhetoric that has surrounded these 
policies, universities may feel that they need to at least give an appearance of doing 
something proactive, lest their political principals get even more upset and adopt an 
aggressive accountability policy in the years ahead.  This may also help explain the 
differential impacts of performance funding across institutional types.  Research 
universities are often the most visible institutions in the state, and thus they may 
feel greater pressure from state policymakers to demonstrate a renewed 
commitment to undergraduate education.  Additionally, the fact that these policies 
have indeed impacted institutional priorities despite their limited scope suggests 
that future performance funding efforts might have substantial effects on 
administrative behavior if policymakers are able to connect more meaningful 
incentives to various metrics of performance.  
 Finally, there are considerable variations in the nature and content of the 
performance funding policies that states have adopted.  For example, some states 
such as Tennessee and Pennsylvania have developed performance funding 
structures that have been lauded as encouraging excellence while maintaining 
differentiation between institutions with varied missions and student populations.  
By comparison, other states, like South Carolina have been criticized for adopting 
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benchmarks that are so easily attainable as to pose no real threat to university 
budgets (Aldeman and Carey 2009; Zumeta 2001).  Understanding the ways in 
which these differences matter is beyond the scope of the current paper, but 
remains a task that warrants considerable attention in the future.  As we move 
forward, these differences in policy design are likely to play a central role in the 
debate regarding accountability reform and performance funding. 
 Performance based accountability is predicated on a causal logic that 
requires administrators and institutions to alter behavior and activities in ways that 
improve student outcomes.  While there has been considerable attention paid to the 
potential implications of these policies, and to the ways in which they represent a 
shift in oversight relationships between higher education and state governments, 
there has been little empirical work to investigate the impacts that these policies 
have on either management or student outcomes.  This paper marks an initial step 
towards building a better understanding of the ways that these policies impact 
management and institutions.  The findings, which suggest that performance 
funding policies have generally been ineffective in their attempts to influence either 
state budget arrangements or institutional spending preferences, highlight the need 
to better understand the mechanisms by which accountability operates.   
 Ultimately, the goal behind performance initiatives is to improve the 
educational experience for students so that they emerge from college with a degree 
that adequately prepares them for the challenges of the modern economy.  With this 
in mind, it is vitally important that policymakers pay more attention to the causal 
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linkages between policy design and administrative responses as they seek to devise 
improved accountability structures, and that scholars invest greater resources to 
empirically investigate these connections as they seek to understand governance 
and organizational performance. 
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 Chapter IV –Perceptions about the Appropriateness of 
Performance-Based Funding 
Much of the causal logic behind performance based accountability has 
rested on the assumption that agency leaders are largely self-interested actors who 
often pursue goals that are at odds with the preferences of elected officials (Thomas 
2001).  As the previous chapter illustrated, however, this adversarial framework is 
not always appropriate.  In the case of performance funding in higher education, 
public universities are responsive to accountability initiatives, not because they 
receive substantial financial incentives for doing so, but rather because they 
perceive them as symbolically meaningful statements regarding the values of 
electoral institutions and perhaps even citizens themselves.  This important finding 
suggests that future attempts at implementing performance oriented accountability 
mechanisms will largely hinge on the extent to which agency leaders see these 
efforts as legitimate and appropriate (Dull 2009; Franklin 2000; Meier and O’Toole 
2006; Moynihan 2008).  And yet, we know very little about the factors that 
influence such beliefs.   
Why do some agency leaders and public managers see accountability efforts 
as appropriate and legitimate, while others ardently oppose performance oriented 
reforms? The present study seeks to address this question directly.  To do so, I 
utilize data collected from a survey of presidents at public colleges and universities 
in the United States to better understand perceptions about the appropriateness of 
recent reform efforts to make organizational funding dependent on performance.    
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Performance Management as a Tool for External Accountability 
 The performance management literature has highlighted several potential 
mechanisms for performance information to improve the public sector (Behn 
2003).  These can broadly be separated into efforts aimed at creating organizational 
learning and improvement (i.e. improvements to internal management), and 
increased transparency and accountability for the purposes of improving oversight 
and political responsiveness (i.e. external control) (De Lancer Julnes 2008; 
Moynihan 2008).  Within the literature on external control and accountability, 
performance regimes have attracted considerable attention for their potential to 
result in several major changes to the public sector.   
First, performance management reforms seek to reshape incentives and 
sanctions for managers and public sector employees by giving them greater 
incentives to be entrepreneurial and results oriented.  In exchange for this increased 
pressure to achieve results, managers within performance regimes receive increased 
autonomy and discretion to shape work processes and make decisions about how to 
best accomplish organizational goals.   Thus, performance management can be seen 
as an extension of the New Public Management ideology that stresses managerial 
creativity and adaptability as a mechanism for improving public management 
(Moynihan 2008). 
In addition to restructuring the incentive and sanction structures that 
managers in the public sector face, performance management regimes also seek to 
aid external actors in their oversight responsibilities.  By providing legislators, the 
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media, and citizens with objective and actionable data about organizational 
productivity, performance management regimes seek to reduce informational costs 
associated with oversight activities, thus improving the capacity for these external 
actors to hold organizations accountable for performance (Thomas 2001).  Further, 
as external actors have access to more objective data about organizational 
performance, the quality of political deliberations should improve by becoming less 
ideological and politically motivated, and more firmly rooted in evidence based 
arguments about the extent to which public policies are effective in achieving 
important socially desirable outcomes, such as reducing crime and poverty and 
improving education, childhood development, and healthcare (Van De Walle and 
Bovaird 2007).  Thus, some have highlighted the potential for performance regimes 
to result in “interactive dialogues” about the goals of public organizations and their 
effectiveness in achieving these goals (Moynihan 2006). 
 As performance regimes have become more and more commonplace over 
the last several decades, however, it has become increasingly apparent that they 
have been far less effective as a tool for administrative reform than many early 
proponents claimed they would be (Johnsen 2005; Joyce and Thompkins 2002; 
Moynihan 2008; Radin 2006; Schick 2001; Thurmaier and Willoughby 2001; U.S. 
Government Accountability Office 2005a, 2005b).  In particular, critics have raised 
serious questions about the extent to which performance regimes have provided 
managers with the appropriate levels of discretion needed to accomplish their 
performance targets (Brudney, Hebert, and Wright 1999), about the potential for 
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them to create perverse incentives that undermine core public values (Bevan and 
Hood 2006; Bohte and Meier 2000; Piotrowski and Rosenbloom 2002; Radnor 
2008), and about the willingness of political actors to take performance information 
seriously (Gilmour and Lewis 2006b; Hou et al. 2011; Melkers and Willoughby 
2001; Thurmaier and Willoughby 2001).   
In many ways, recent efforts at performance oriented reform in higher 
education have mirrored this discussion.  While traditional accountability 
arrangements for public colleges and university have revolved mostly around 
procedural and access issues, and have largely been characterized as providing 
institutions with relatively little oversight or aggressive opposition, the last two 
decades have seen a dramatic shift in the approach taken by state governments 
(Zumeta 2001; Zumeta et al. 2012).  Whereas state governments in earlier 
generations often approached public universities with considerable deference, the 
modern policy environment has become substantially more adversarial.   
Much of this distrust has centered on concerns about the extent to which 
universities have been responsible in curtailing cost increases (Archibald and 
Feldman 2008a; McLendon, Hearn, and Deaton 2006; Mumper 2001).  
Additionally, some observers have been critical of the overall performance of 
public universities.  According to the most recent data, the average public college 
in America graduates less than 60% of its students, and graduation rates for many 
minority groups are much lower (Carey 2008).  Many have attributed this lack of 
performance to misaligned incentives for these institutions.  Rather than rewarding 
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universities for focusing on undergraduate student outcomes, such as graduation 
rates and course completion, the current fiscal environment largely incentivizes 
enrollment.  As a result, critics argue that public colleges often shirk on their 
responsibility for educating their undergraduates, choosing instead to focus on 
investments that aid in recruitment (i.e. construction of new dormitories and 
workout facilities) and that promote research and development (i.e. reduced 
teaching loads for full-time faculty) (Complete College America 2010b; Gillen 
2013; Weisbrod, Ballou, and Asch 2008).   
Performance funding policies seek to rectify these problems by integrating 
performance measures related to undergraduate student outcomes into the 
budgeting process (Burke 2005).  While the size and scope of performance funding 
policies can differ substantially from state to state, the premise behind each of these 
policies is largely the same.  As institutional funding structures are redesigned to be 
more performance oriented, state policymakers expect that administrators will shift 
priorities away from non-outcome oriented activities, and will focus more 
extensively on bolstering undergraduate education.   
Despite the promise and potential for performance management, however, a 
number of recent studies have concluded that performance funding oriented 
reforms have had negligible impacts on organizational performance and student 
outcomes (Sanford and Hunter 2010; Shin and Milton 2004; Shin 2010; Volkwein 
and Tandberg 2008).  While the empirical evidence about the reasons for the 
ineffectiveness of performance funding remain limited, many have highlighted 
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problems such as limited willingness of state actors to provide meaningful sums of 
additional funding for improved performance, as well as low buy-in and awareness 
of statewide performance objectives on the part of faculty and university 
administrators (Dougherty and Reddy 2011). 
The Importance of Leadership for Performance Based Accountability 
While there are a wide range of factors that doubtlessly influence the 
success or failure of any reform effort such as performance based accountability, 
one of the crucial variables that previous research has found to be a driving force 
behind the efficacy of these efforts is the extent to which organizational leaders and 
other key agency actors react favorably (Dull 2009; Franklin 2000; Mazmanian and 
Sabatier 1983; Meier 2009b; Moynihan and Ingraham 2004; Moynihan 2008).  
Even within the policy domain of higher education, which has sometimes been 
characterized as an area where organizational leaders are highly constrained in their 
ability to shape behavior (Cohen and March 1986), recent scholarship on 
performance funding has highlighted the importance of university presidents in 
shaping successful reform (Burke 2005; Dougherty and Reddy 2011).   
Organizational leaders, such as university presidents, have the capacity to 
dramatically influence the effectiveness of performance oriented reforms for a 
variety of reasons.  First, they often have considerable discretion, both in terms of 
the amount of energy and resources that are dedicated to various tasks within the 
organization, and in terms of the way they choose to structure work-flows within 
the organization.  Within the performance management literature, several scholars 
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have found that managers’ use of routines and structures, such as weekly meetings 
to discuss progress towards the achievement of performance metrics, plays a vital 
role in creating a performance oriented culture and improving productivity (Behn 
2006; Moynihan, Pandey, and Wright Forthcoming; Moynihan 2008).  Second, 
they provide both symbolic rewards and material resources to activities associated 
with satisfying a performance regime, which sends powerful signals to lower level 
employees about the extent to which they should aggressively implement the goals 
and objectives specified by the performance policy (Dull 2009).  Third, as the 
leader of the organization, these actors are often in position to frame debates about 
mission and performance within the political arena, which can provide meaningful 
cues to other employees about the extent to which an accountability regime is 
credible and legitimate (Moynihan 2008).   
 Despite the central importance of administrative perceptions about 
performance based accountability mechanisms, existing scholarship has struggled 
to understand the sources of variation in the ways that administrators react to 
performance management reforms (Moynihan 2010).  Moreover, even the broader 
literature on bureaucratic values and administrative politics has been relatively 
limited in examining the impact of individual-level beliefs among organizational 
leaders and public managers on policy implementation (Meier and O’Toole 2006).  
While there have been some notable recent developments in efforts to empirically 
measure bureaucratic values (Bertelli and Grose 2011; Clinton and Lewis 2008; 
Clinton et al. 2012), much of the existing research has relied primarily on the use of 
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proxy measures, such as gender or racial and ethnicity characteristics, to 
characterize the policy preferences of public administrators (Hicklin and Meier 
2008; Keiser 2010; Keiser et al. 2002; Meier and O’Toole 2006; Meier and Stewart 
1991, 1992; Nicholson-Crotty, Grissom, and Nicholson-Crotty 2011; Roch and 
Pitts 2012; Selden 1997; Sowa and Selden 2003).   
As a result of these limitations, we know relatively little about the causal 
mechanisms that result in managerial acceptance or opposition of performance 
oriented reforms.  This study seeks to contribute to both the literature on 
performance management, as well as discussions about bureaucratic values more 
generally, by exploring a broad range of variables at both the individual and 
organizational level to understand perceptions about the appropriateness of 
performance based accountability. 
Survey of University Presidents 
The data for this study come from a variety of sources.  Most important 
among these is a survey of presidents at public colleges and universities, which 
captures both perceptions about accountability policies and their impacts on higher 
education, as well as values and beliefs regarding a variety of other issues, 
including beliefs about the ways that performance information is used by political 
actors in their state as well as their own political ideology.  Following the 2011-
2012 academic school-year, paper copies of the survey instrument were mailed to 
presidents at every public, 4-year institution that was listed as bachelor degree 
granting or higher according to the 2010 Carnegie system for classifying colleges 
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and universities.  Of the 558 institutions that met this criteria, 138 respondents 
answered the survey, yielding a response rate of 24.7%3.   
Perceptions of University Presidents about Performance and Institutional 
Funding 
 The survey employed two questions to measure perceptions about 
performance based funding.  First, the respondents were asked how much funding 
for their institution was dependent on performance.  They were then asked to rate 
the extent to which they believed that funding should depend on performance 
(response categories for both questions ranged from 0 – Not at All to 10- 
Completely).  Thus, the survey captures both perceptions about the extent to which 
performance is already important for funding, and also perceptions about the extent 
to which performance based approaches to funding higher education are 
normatively desirable.  By taking the difference between these two questions, we 
can therefore construct a measure for perceptions about whether performance based 
funding has gone too far (i.e. funding depends more on performance than it 
should), or whether such policies should be expanded upon (i.e. funding should 
depend more on performance than it currently does).   
                                                 
3 To assess potential threats to external validity posed by non-response bias, I 
analyzed respondent characteristics across a wide variety of institutional 
characteristics that are often viewed as important within the literature on higher 
education, and found them to be generally representative of the population of 
institutions that were surveyed  
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Figure 4.1: How Much Does Funding Depend on Performance? 
 
Figure 4.1 illustrates the distribution of responses for perceptions about the 
importance of performance for current levels of funding.  Not surprisingly, 
university presidents largely perceive performance as relatively unimportant when 
it comes to the amount of funding that their university receives.  The mean score on 
this question was 2.64, and 66.7 percent of respondents rated the importance of 
funding for performance as a 3 or lower.  Interestingly, however, respondents from 
performance funding states do, in fact, perceive that funding depends more upon 
performance than do respondents from states without such policies (mean score of 
3.86 compared for institutions in states with performance funding compared to 2.22 
for those in states without).  Given the findings from Chapter 3, which found no 
connection between performance and funding when examining objective budgeting 
data, this suggests that performance funding policies have been somewhat 
successful in changing perceptions about the importance of performance for 
funding, even though they often fail to provide substantial material incentives for 
improved performance. 
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Figure 4.2: How Much Should Funding Depend on Performance? 
 
Figure 4.3: Differences Between How Much Funding Should Depend on 
Performance Versus How Much it Does Depend on Performance 
 
Turning next to responses about the normative value of performance based 
funding (see figure 4.2), university presidents are much more supportive about the 
prospects of using performance in funding decisions than much of the mainstream 
narrative about accountability in higher education would suggest.  The mean value 
for perceptions about the extent to which funding should depend on performance 
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was 4.74, and 54.8% of respondents answered 5 or above.  Thus, university 
presidents, in general, are fairly open to an expansion of performance-based 
funding, at least in principle.   
Similarly, figure 4.3 illustrates the distribution of values for the difference 
between perceptions of actual importance of performance versus perceptions about 
how much performance should matter for institutional funding.  As previously 
discussed, positive values on this measure indicate respondents who believe that 
performance should matter more than it currently does, while negative values 
indicate respondents who believe that performance matters more than it should (a 
value of zero represents a respondent who believes that performance matters just as 
much as it should).  The mean value for this measure is 2.1, which indicates that on 
average, university presidents would actually be in favor (at least in theory) of a 
movement towards greater use of performance information in the budgeting 
process. 
 In some ways, this finding that university presidents desire more 
performance oriented funding is surprising, given the existing narrative about 
opposition to performance funding policies on the part of many public universities.  
On the other hand, however, this finding underscores the fact that many institutions 
have become frustrated with the funding environment in their states.  As the 
political climate has become increasingly hostile towards higher education, 
performance based funding may be viewed by some institutions as a way to 
increase funding.  If, as a university president, you perceive that informal and 
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political processes are likely to result in reduced funding, then a movement towards 
a more objective and data driven funding model might be quite attractive, 
particularly if you know that your institution is performing well on salient 
dimensions of performance.  This assumes, however, that the funding policy will be 
crafted in a way such that it is based on reasonable expectations and fair treatment 
of public universities, and that it actually rewards improved performance.  It also 
assumes that performance management is a serious attempt at improving higher 
education, rather than an underhanded mechanism for policymakers to promote an 
ideological agenda aimed at privatization and reduced spending. 
To better understand the source of variation in perceptions about whether 
performance based funding should be expanded, the remaining portion of this study 
will employ multivariate analysis, using OLS regression, on two dependent 
variables: 1) perceptions about how much funding should depend on performance, 
and 2) perceptions about whether funding should depend more or less on 
performance than it currently does.  While similar, these two variables capture 
slightly different beliefs about performance based funding.  The first measures 
perceptions about the desirability of performance based funding in the abstract, 
while the second indicates beliefs about whether current levels of performance 
based funding are appropriate relative to the desired level of performance driven 
funding.  In order to limit the potential for common source bias (Meier and 
O’Toole 2012), and to gain insight on the importance on a variety of factors in the 
organizational and political environment, data for this analysis come from both the 
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survey and from publicly available datasets.  Diagnostic tests for non-constant 
variance revealed heteroskedasticity in models for both dependent variables, so I 
used robust standard errors in the analysis that follows.   
Administrative Reactions to Performance Based Funding 
In thinking about the motivational bases for administrative behavior, 
scholarship has largely evolved around two competing views.  On one side are 
those who argue that public administrators can generally be conceived of as self-
interested, budget maximizing bureaucrats who are constantly working to exploit 
their informational advantages in order to avoid meaningful oversight (Finer 1941; 
Niskanen 1971).  In contrast with this self-interested (and somewhat adversarial) 
framework, others have argued that public managers are better viewed as  
intrinsically oriented individuals who are largely responsive to professional norms 
and their own internal values systems (Bertelli and Lynn 2006; Friedrich 1940; 
Meier and O’Toole 2006; Perry and Wise 1990).  
This study argues that, within the context of performance management, 
public managers are likely to be influenced by both perceptions about external 
rewards and by their own internal values.  In the case of higher education, we 
would thus expect administrators at institutions that are already performing well on 
established benchmark indicators will be more accepting of performance oriented 
reforms.  This is both because they are likely to perceive the potential for revenue 
increases, and also because they are less likely to see performance oriented reforms 
as a substantial threat.  In higher education, graduation rates have become an 
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extremely popular metric for assessing institutional performance, both within 
academic research and within existing performance funding policies (see chapter 3 
for a more extensive discussion about this).  Data on six-year (150% of normal 
time) graduation rates come from the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data 
System (IPEDS).  Because it generally takes one year after a cohort has graduated 
for this data to be collected and reported, this variable is lagged one year after the 
cohort graduated, or seven years after the cohort initially enrolled (thus, the 
graduation rate for the 2004 cohort represents the information that policymakers 
and university actors had access to during the 2011 school year). 
H1: University presidents whose institutions have higher graduation 
rates will be more accepting of performance-based funding. 
 
Another factor that is likely to be important in perceptions of performance 
based accountability is the extent to which administrators have substantial first-
hand experience with these policies.  I include two measures of experience with 
performance based funding.  First, I measure the extent to which institutional 
funding currently depends on performance, as a way to capture perceptions about 
the funding environment.  Second, I also include a dichotomous measure for 
whether the institution is located in a state with a performance funding policy, 
using the same coding scheme that was employed for Chapter 3.  It is unclear how 
we would expect exposure to performance based funding to impact perceptions 
about the appropriateness of such policies.  One possibility is that university 
presidents who have first-hand experience with performance based funding become 
comfortable with it over time, and are thus less resistant to the idea of increased use 
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of performance information in the future.  On the other hand, particularly if 
experiences with performance based funding are largely negative or have been 
perceived as unfair, the reverse may be true, in which case university presidents 
will be less accepting of performance based funding as they are exposed to these 
policies. 
H2A: University presidents who have experienced greater exposure to 
performance reforms will be more accepting of performance based 
funding. 
 
H2B University presidents who have experienced greater exposure to 
performance reforms will be less accepting of performance based 
funding. 
 
Additionally, given the failure of many performance oriented reforms to live 
up to their potential, we might also expect administrators to be influenced by 
concerns about the extent to which these efforts represent meaningful efforts to 
improve performance, as opposed to political gamesmanship.  I employ three 
variables to capture characteristics about the external political environment.  First, I 
use the percentage of state legislators who are Democrats, collected from Carl 
Klarner’s dataset on partisan balance (Klarner 2012), to capture the partisan make-
up of the state.  Given the fact that much of the opposition for higher education 
funding has come from Republican lawmakers, we might expect university 
presidents to perceive that accountability efforts in more conservative states are 
often thinly veiled attempts to move towards privatization or reduce state support 
for higher education.  Thus, in states with more Democratic legislators, university 
presidents may be more likely to see performance management as a less threatening 
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attempt to make a good faith effort at improving governance and rewarding better 
performance.  As a result, I expect that university presidents will be more likely to 
embrace performance oriented reforms as the percentage of state legislators who 
are Democratic increases. 
H3: University presidents in states with a higher percentage of 
Democratic legislators will be more accepting of performance-based 
funding. 
 
In addition to the partisan makeup of the state, I also employ two perceptual 
measures taken from the survey instrument about the ways that performance 
information is used by political actors.  To capture perceptions about the extent to 
which performance information is used in dysfunctional ways, university presidents 
were asked about whether they believed that state actors often manipulate data to 
make it say whatever they want, whether they perceive that data is primarily used 
for political posturing rather than substantive policy improvement, and whether 
they felt that hostile actors often used data to unfairly punish their institution.  
Exact question wording for these items can be found in the appendix.  The three 
items were combined into a single index (α = 0.715). 
H4: University presidents who perceive that performance information 
use in their state is dysfunctional will be less accepting of performance 
based funding.  
 
In addition to these pragmatic motivations, I also expect administrative 
perceptions to be influenced by internal values, such as political ideology.  Despite 
the fact that performance management is often trumpeted as a value-neutral, 
objective alternative to politically biased forms of decision-making, many of these 
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policies have in fact been implemented in ways that are clearly driven by ideology 
and partisanship (Clinton and Lewis 2008; Moynihan and Lavertu 2012; Radin 
2006).  Given that the ideological underpinnings of performance based 
accountability have often been associated with New Performance Management, and 
that many of these initiatives have been embraced by political conservatives, I 
expect that university presidents who identify as more politically conservative will 
have greater acceptance of performance based funding.   
H5: Political conservatism will be positively related to acceptance of 
performance based funding.  
 
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics (Chapter 4) 
 Mean Std. Min Max 
Funding Should Depend on Performance 4.74 2.34 0 10 
Funding Does Depend on Performance 2.64 2.34 0 8 
Fund. Should Depend More on Perform. Than Does 2.10 2.79 -5 10 
Performance Funding Policy 0.26 0.44 0 1 
% of Legislators Democrats 44.49 12.85 19.05 82 
Graduation Rates (Latest available info) 46.06 15.68 12.50 92.69 
Dysfunctional Use of Performance Info. 4.45 1.32 1 7 
Political Conservatism (1=Str. Lib.; 5=Str. Con.) 2.77 0.93 1 5 
Research (Carnegie) 0.29 0.46 0 1 
White 0.88 0.32 0 1 
Male 0.76 0.43 0 1 
Experience 5.91 4.54 0.17 21 
% Minority Students 20.34 20.50 2.27 96.05 
 
I also control for experience, as measured by the number of years that a 
respondent has been president at their current university, and for race and gender, 
though I have no clear directional hypotheses about how these variables will impact 
acceptance of performance based funding.  Finally, given the important differential 
impacts that performance based funding is often expected to have on institutions 
according to their mission and student body characteristics (Burke 2005; Dougherty 
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and Reddy 2011; Fryar 2011), I also include control measures for whether the 
respondent is president at an institution that is classified as a research university 
according to the 2010 Carnegie Basic classification scheme, as well as the 
percentage of students who are either Hispanic of African-American.  As was the 
case with graduation rates, these data come from IPEDS.  Summary statistics for all 
variables can be found in table 4.1.   
Results 
 Results for the first dependent variable (perceptions about the extent to 
which funding should depend on performance) are listed in table 4.2.  As 
previously discussed, I measure exposure to performance based accountability in 
two ways: 1) perceptions about the extent to which funding depends on 
performance and 2) whether the state has adopted a performance funding policy.  
Given the fact that performance funding policies appear to be an important factor in 
shaping perceptions of how much institutional funding depends on performance, 
there are potential issues with endogeneity and multi-colinearity for these two 
measures (r = 0.308).  Thus, I ran separate models with each measure included 
independently, as well as a third model with both included.  Models 1, 2, and 3 
reflect these alternate specifications.   
 Taken together, there are several important findings that emerge from these 
models.  First, with regards to exposure to performance based accountability, I find 
that perceptions about the extent to which funding does depend on performance are 
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positively related to perceptions about the extent to which it should depend on 
performance.  A one  
standard deviation increase in perceptions about the importance of performance has 
results in almost a one point increase in perceptions about how much funding 
should depend on performance (2.34 * 0.400 = 0.936).  Interestingly, however, 
experiences with performance funding policies themselves have the opposite effect.   
With regards to the external political climate, I find that perceptions about 
the extent to which funding should be dependent on performance are positively 
related to the percentage of state legislators who are Democrats.  A one standard 
deviation increase in the percentage of Democratic legislators results in more than a 
0.3 point increase in perceptions about the extent to which funding should depend 
on performance (12.85 * 0.025 = 0.321).  Conversely, perceptions about the extent 
to which performance information is used in a dysfunctional manner are negatively 
related to perceptions about the extent to which funding should depend on 
performance.  A one standard deviation increase in beliefs that performance 
information is used dysfunctionally within the political process (1.32) results in a 
0.59 point decrease in acceptance of performance based funding.  Finally, objective 
measures of organizational performance (graduation rates) are positively related to 
perceptions about the extent to which performance should govern funding levels.  
A one-standard deviation increase in institutional graduation rates (15.68) is 
associated with a 0.61 increase in perceptions about the extent to which 
performance should be important. 
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Table 4.2: How Much Should Funding Depend on Performance? 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Experiences with Performance Funding    
Funding Does Depend on Performance 0.360***  0.400*** 
 (4.97)  (5.25) 
Performance Funding Policy  -0.204 -0.819+ 
  (-0.42) (-1.76) 
    
External Political Environment    
% of Legislators Democrats 0.026+ 0.021 0.025+ 
 (1.72) (1.40) (1.77) 
Dysfunctional Use of Performance Info. -0.462** -0.310* -0.449** 
 (-3.00) (-2.00) (-2.84) 
    
Organizational Performance    
Graduation Rates (Latest available info) 0.045** 0.031+ 0.039* 
 (3.15) (1.82) (2.55) 
    
Internal Values and Demographics    
Political Conservatism 0.782*** 0.828*** 0.816*** 
 (3.73) (3.91) (4.13) 
White 1.602* 1.382+ 1.498* 
 (2.43) (1.95) (2.28) 
Male 0.172 0.252 0.183 
 (0.44) (0.54) (0.49) 
Experience -0.028 -0.058 -0.016 
 (-0.75) (-1.60) (-0.41) 
    
Controls    
Research (Carnegie) -0.119 0.156 -0.048 
 (-0.23) (0.29) (-0.10) 
% Minority Students 0.012 0.010 0.010 
 (1.41) (1.04) (1.09) 
Constant -0.964 0.356 -0.686 
 (-0.70) (0.22) (-0.50) 
Observations 121 121 121 
R2 0.376 0.254 0.395 
t statistics in parentheses 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
With regards to internal values and demographic variables, there are also a 
few notable findings.  Most importantly, I find that political conservatism is 
positively related to perceptions about the importance that performance should play 
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in guiding institutional funding.  A shift from the very liberal to very conservative 
is associated with an increase of more than 4 points on perceptions about the extent 
to which funding should depend on performance.  I also find that White 
respondents are associated with increased acceptance of performance based 
funding.  To help gain a sense for the magnitude of each of the relationships 
discussed above, figure 4.4 displays effects plots for each of the variables that 
achieved statistical significance.  In these plots, all other variables are set to their 
mean or modal values, and the variable of interest is allowed to vary across the 
range of reported values. 
Figure 4.4: Effect Plots for Statistically Significant Variables 
 
 
Should Funding Depend on Performance More Than it Does? 
Turning next to beliefs about the extent to which funding should depend on 
performance more than it does, findings are presented in table 4.3.  One potential 
92 
concern about this variable is that responses for those who rate performance as 
having a large impact on funding might vary in some systematic way in terms of 
their relationship with perceptions of how much funding should depend on 
performance from those who see performance as having little relationship to 
funding.  In other words, a respondent who rates the importance of performance for 
funding as an 8 and who says that funding should depend entirely on performance 
(10) would score a value of 2, but this person might be qualitatively different than 
someone who says that funding does not depend at all on performance (0) but that 
it should depend on performance a little (2).  To help control for this possibility, I 
ran a second set of models where perceptions about the importance of performance 
for funding are included on the right-hand side of the equation, and the substantive 
interpretation of the model remains largely unchanged. 
In large part, these results support the findings presented about perceptions 
regarding the desired importance of performance for funding in the abstract.  As 
was the case before, I find that exposure to performance funding policies is 
associated with a lower level of acceptance of performance based funding, while 
the percentage of legislators who are Democrats and objective organizational 
performance (graduation rates) are positively related to beliefs about the extent to 
which performance should depend on performance more than it does.  I also find 
that perceptions about the extent to which performance information is used in a 
dysfunctional manner are negatively related to acceptance of increased reliance on 
performance based funding.  Finally, both political conservatism and racial 
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demographics (White) are again statistically significant and positively related to 
perceptions that performance based funding should be expanded. 
Table 4.3: Should Funding Depend on Performance More Than It Does? 
 (4) (5) 
Experiences with Performance Based Funding   
Performance Funding Policy -1.740*** -0.819+ 
 (-3.41) (-1.76) 
   
External Political Climate   
% of Legislators Democrats 0.031+ 0.025+ 
 (1.84) (1.77) 
Dysfunctional Use of Performance Info. -0.657*** -0.449** 
 (-3.65) (-2.84) 
   
Organizational Performance   
Graduation Rates (Latest available info) 0.050** 0.039* 
 (2.79) (2.55) 
   
Internal Values and Demographics   
Political Conservatism 0.798** 0.816*** 
 (3.09) (4.13) 
   
   
White 1.671+ 1.498* 
 (1.94) (2.28) 
Male 0.080 0.183 
 (0.20) (0.49) 
Experience 0.048 -0.016 
 (0.99) (-0.41) 
   
Controls   
Research (Carnegie) -0.353 -0.048 
 (-0.63) (-0.10) 
Funding Does Depend on Performance  -0.600*** 
  (-7.86) 
   
Constant -2.247 -0.686 
 (-1.27) (-0.50) 
Observations 121 121 
R2 0.394 0.603 
t statistics in parentheses 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Discussion 
 Overall, the findings from the empirical analysis above make a number of 
notable contributions to our understanding of leadership and managerial responses 
to performance management regimes.  The finding that political ideology is 
strongly related to perceptions about performance based funding is both interesting 
and important.  First, the fact that university presidents exhibit variation in terms of 
political ideology, and that these ideological values influence policy preferences in 
meaningful ways helps to confirm existing theories about the importance of  
bureaucratic values in policy implementation (Bertelli and Lynn 2006; Meier and 
O’Toole 2006).  Second, and perhaps more importantly, while performance 
regimes are often promoted as an apolitical, value-neutral based reform, these 
results suggest that such claims should be approached with considerable 
skepticism.  The fact that the partisan make-up of the state legislature influences 
perceptions of performance based accountability only reinforces this point.  Despite 
the efforts of many reformers in recent years to pursue bipartisan efforts for 
performance based reforms, beliefs about the appropriate role of performance 
information in governing public institutions continue to be ideologically charged.   
One interesting prospect for future research on this topic would be to 
explore the causal mechanisms for this divisiveness.  It may be the case that 
differences about opinions related to legitimacy of performance management are 
driven by deep normative beliefs related to the appropriateness of results oriented 
government and the validity of quantitative data.  Alternatively, it may be the case 
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that opinions about performance management are more driven by heuristics and 
group attachments, wherein political conservatives are more favorable to them 
because they perceive that performance management is often promoted by other 
conservatives.  In other words, is this a clash of worldviews and ideologies, or 
simply a conflict related to political partisanship and the way that people interpret 
reform efforts? As reformers think about potential ways to “de-politicize” 
performance management, these questions will be of central importance. 
 In keeping with this theme, this study also found important effects from the 
external political environment.  As one might expect, public administrators are not 
likely to be receptive to performance based reforms if they perceive that the 
information and data generated by such reforms are likely to be used for political, 
rather than substantive purposes.  Unfortunately, existing research suggests that 
creating forums and environments where performance information is likely to be 
taken seriously and not abused for political purposes will be a difficult task 
(Moynihan 2008; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; Weiss 1988).  Often times, 
both elected officials and actors within the advocacy community face strong 
incentives in the short term to use performance data to further their own political 
agenda, rather than to pursue policy aimed at the collective good.  Moreover, as 
distrust between competing coalitions tends to increase exponentially over time 
(Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993), it can be almost impossible to establish neutral 
and objective bases of performance and measurement that everybody agrees on.  
When performance management is added to these types of environments, it is likely 
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to exacerbate conflicts, rather than help alleviate them.  Thus, a more thorough 
examination of the causal factors that can create well-functioning performance 
based regime is warranted, and would be a suitable topic for future studies. 
 Perhaps the most important finding from this study is that performance 
based funding policies are poorly equipped to shift managerial preferences about 
the value of performance based accountability.  This is true whether we measure 
these perceptions as an abstract normative concept related to the attractiveness of 
performance based funding, or if we compare their normative preferences to their 
perceptions about the current budgetary process.  The fact that performance funding 
policies have not only been largely been ineffective at shaping objective budgetary 
incentives (see Chapter 3), but are also associated with lower levels of support for 
performance based approaches to funding suggests that administrators have often 
reacted negatively to them, not because they are opposed to performance 
management in practice, but rather because they perceive the policies themselves as 
ineffective and perhaps harmful.   
It remains unclear, however, if this disconnect is the result of policy design, 
the lack of incentives for improved performance, or the adversarial nature in which 
many of these policies have been adopted and imposed on institutions.  I find 
strong evidence that university presidents are not only open to the idea of 
performance based funding, but that when they perceive that their funding actually 
depends on organizational performance, they become more comfortable with the 
idea of further movement towards performance based accountability.  This suggests 
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that the failure of performance funding in higher education may have more to do 
with the individual policies that have been adopted and implemented, rather than an 
inherent flaw in performance based accountability.  It is important to note that as 
future states adopt these policies, they may be able to learn lessons from previous 
failures in performance management, which could result in more effective 
accountability mechanisms moving forward.  Thus, it is vital that future research 
examine questions of policy design and adoption in greater detail in order to better 
address some these more nuanced questions about performance regimes and 
effective policy design. 
Conclusion 
 Performance based funding reforms have become incredibly popular in 
recent years, but there has been remarkably little scholarly attention to questions 
about managerial perceptions of and responses to these efforts.  This study found 
that administrative perceptions of performance based regimes are driven by a 
variety of factors, including both pragmatic concerns and ideological values.  In 
doing so, it also uncovered a number of potential shortcomings with existing 
performance funding policy efforts, and suggests that while administrators are 
relatively open to the idea of performance based reforms, in theory, that they 
remain skeptical about their implementation in practice.   
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 Chapter V – Using Data for Performance at Public 
Universities 
 Thus far, this dissertation has focused primarily on performance data and its 
role in budgeting and external accountability, but this is not the only way that 
performance information is used within the public sector.  In addition to these 
external accountability systems, there has also been a dramatic increase in the 
extent to which many organizations (both public and private) have sought to 
incorporate data and performance management as a tool for improving internal 
operations so they can become more adaptive, efficient, and effective (Behn 2003; 
Karr et al. 2006; de Lancer Julnes and Holzer 2001; Moynihan 2008; Willis, 
Mastrofski, and Weisburd 2007).   
Although these internal performance management systems are similar in 
some respects to external accountability arrangements (most notably in that they 
both rely heavily on quantitative data as a tool for improving decision-making), 
they also differ in important ways.  First, external accountability policies are 
essentially mandatory policies that public organizations must participate in, while 
internal management systems are largely voluntary efforts that agencies have 
considerable discretion to shape and use (or not use) as they wish.  Second, while 
external systems are adopted with the primary goal of achieving accountability and 
political control, internal systems are largely implemented with the primary goals 
of improving organizational performance and dealing with external stakeholders. 
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Despite the increasing prevalence of performance management within 
public agencies throughout government at all levels over the last couple of decades, 
there is still substantial variation in the extent to which organizations employ these 
tactics.  While some have been quite aggressive in using performance information 
and data to drive decisions, others have been hesitant to do so (Behn 2008; Kroll 
and Vogel 2013; de Lancer Julnes 2008; Moynihan and Hawes 2012; Moynihan, 
Pandey, and  Wright 2012; Moynihan and Pandey 2010; Poister, Pasha, and 
Edwards 2012; Pollitt 2006).  Given that performance oriented reforms have 
become so salient in recent years, questions about the factors that drive the 
adoption and use of performance systems for internal management are of central 
importance (Kroll 2012; Moynihan 2010).   
Within higher education policy, there has been considerable effort recently 
to not only understand the types of external accountability arrangements that are 
discussed in chapters 3 and 4, but also to explore important questions regarding the 
implementation of internal performance management systems and routines.    In 
particular, researchers have begun to seriously think about ways that quantitative 
data and internal performance diagnostics can be employed to help promote better 
student learning outcomes, to contain rising costs and tuition increases, to identify 
opportunities for external funding from alumni and private donors, and to be more 
effective in efforts to expand capacity for research and development (Coburn and 
Turner 2012; Colyvas 2012; Ewell 2011; McLaughlin and McLaughlin 2007; 
Weisbrod, Ballou, and Asch 2008). 
100 
This study uses data taken from a survey of presidents at public universities 
(the same survey that was employed in the previous chapter) to advance our 
understanding about the use of data and performance management strategies within 
public organizations.  The central research question for this chapter is, “Why do 
university administrators choose to employ performance management strategies?”   
In addition, I also explore variation in the extent to which public universities use 
performance management strategies for three tasks that are central to public 
management: 1) strategic planning, 2) evaluating employees, and 3) interacting 
with external stakeholders.   
Why Use Performance Management? 
While research about external systems of accountability and performance 
based budgeting has generally found these reforms to be ineffective (Bohte and 
Meier 2000; Brudney, Hebert, and Wright 1999; Hood 2006; Radin 2006; Ravitch 
2010; Thurmaier and Willoughby 2001), scholarship about performance 
management within organizations is much more optimistic about the potential for 
performance information to generate positive outcomes and promote organizational 
learning (Behn 2006; Moynihan 2008).  As opposed to inter-institutional settings, 
where performance data is often used in an adversarial manner that leads to distrust 
and heightened political conflict, performance information use within organizations 
can often be quite productive because it provides a mechanism for managers and 
employees to gain a better sense of both long-term strategic plans and short-term 
challenges.  Because agencies tend to be less heterogeneous in terms of the 
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preferences and values that members hold, as compared to actors in electoral 
institutions and the broader political environment, and because they often contain 
hierarchical structures that reduce transaction and decision-making costs, 
performance data, as a tool of internal management, can often be effective even in 
policy areas where external systems of performance based accountability have been 
dysfunctional or ineffective (Moynihan 2008).   
Performance management has several potential benefits for public 
organizations.  As organizations build routines and structures to analyze and 
discuss performance information, they not only enhance the capacity for managers 
to evaluate the performance of subordinates and to provide guidance or corrective 
action when needed, but they also build a culture that is oriented around learning 
and adaptation (Behn 2006).  Further, Moynihan (2005) argues that when used 
effectively, performance management can also lead to “double loop” learning, 
which allows agencies to re-evaluate key assumptions and values that underlie the 
central goals and mission of the organization.  In doing so, public agencies are 
better positioned to help identify breakdowns in both the design and causal logic of 
programs and policies, and can help put forth alternative strategies for dealing with 
complex social problems that may be more effective.  For example, Moynihan 
(2005) found “double-loop” learning brought on by performance management in 
the Department of Corrections allowed Vermont to make crucial changes in 
policies aimed at rehabilitation and overcrowding.  These changes ultimately 
produced substantial improvements in the state’s criminal justice system, and 
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helped the agency identify and correct long-term issues that many other states are 
still struggling to deal with.  Thus, performance management represents an 
important mechanism by which organizations can improve their capacity to learn 
from mistakes, to improve efficiency and effectiveness, and to promote change. 
While performance management can sometimes be useful, however, it also 
imposes non-trivial costs on individuals and organizations.  These include both 
psychological and cognitive costs associated with using quantitative data as 
opposed to less formal and more inter-personal sources of information to guide 
decision-making (Behn 2002; Kroll and Vogel 2013), along with the material costs 
associated with designing and maintaining analytical systems to manage data 
collection and storage (Radin 2006).  As a result of these costs, performance 
management has often been characterized as an under-utilized strategy within the 
public sector (Barzelay 1992; Hatry 2006; Julnes and Holzer 2008; Keehley and 
Abercrombie 2008; Osborne and Gaebler 1992).  Indeed, often times external 
systems of accountability are adopted, in part, to encourage greater use of 
performance data within public organizations (Moynihan and Hawes 2012).   
Thus, we can think of performance management as a type of investment, 
with both potential payoffs (in the form of improved information and enhanced 
capacity to learn and adapt) and potential costs (such as the effort associated with 
collecting and analyzing data or the potential for PM to create hostility, distrust, or 
perverse incentives that undermine organizational culture).  The key puzzle, then, is 
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to understand why some organizations and managers choose to make this 
investment, while others do not. 
Who Uses Performance Management? 
In recent years, as scholars have become increasingly interested in 
developing a theory of performance information use, and as practitioners and 
policymakers have sought to encourage public organizations to employ 
performance management strategies, empirical research on the factors that drive the 
adoption and use of performance management has exploded in popularity.  Kroll 
(2012) identifies at least twenty empirical studies of managerial use of performance 
information, and highlights a wide range of variables, at the individual, 
organizational, and environmental levels that have been found to be important.  
These include factors such as organizational culture and access to resources, 
managerial experience and personal values, and influence from external political 
actors.  Unfortunately, many of these studies have found conflicting results as to 
the relative importance of these factors, and it remains unclear whether these 
differences are due to variation in survey design, differences in the various policy 
areas that scholars have analyzed, or if they are simply a result of measurement 
error.  As a result, several scholars have called for additional research to further 
explore this topic (Ammons and Rivenbark 2008; Kroll 2012; de Lancer Julnes 
2008; Moynihan and Hawes 2012; Poister, Pasha, and Edwards 2012; Yang and 
Pandey 2009). 
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It is also important to note that there are many ways that managers might 
use performance data within their organizations to achieve better outcomes.  Behn 
(2003) identifies eight purposes for performance management.  These include 
efforts aimed at improving evaluation of program effectiveness, recognizing and 
celebrating successes, control over subordinates, budgeting, employee motivation, 
external engagement and demonstration of value to stakeholders, and tasks related 
to learning and organizational improvement.  Van Dooren, Bouckaert, and Halligan 
(2010) condense this list, and argue that there are three main ways that performance 
information can be used: 1) for learning, 2) for steering and control, and 3) for 
giving account to external stakeholders.  Unfortunately, while scholars have made 
considerable progress in terms of conceptualizing the various uses of performance 
data, we know much less about how the causal factors that shape decisions to use 
data for these purposes.  
The fact that performance management relates to such a broad array of 
administrative tasks suggests that decisions about using these strategies will be 
complex and contextual.  In organizations like public colleges and universities, 
which have a large number of broad, and somewhat ambiguous goals related to 
tasks ranging from undergraduate instruction, to research and scientific discovery, 
to public service and community involvement (Cohen and March 1986), this may 
be particularly true.  While performance management is often talked about as a 
package of potential reform strategies that more or less clump together, it may be 
more useful, as Behn (2003) suggests, to more carefully explore differences in the 
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ways that organizations approach using performance management with respect to 
different tasks and objectives.  For instance, one might expect the factors that lead 
an organization to employ performance management with respect to learning and 
change to differ, at least somewhat, from the factors that drive decisions about 
using performance information and data to assess employees or engage external 
stakeholders about organizational productivity.  With a few notable exceptions 
(Moynihan and Hawes 2012; Moynihan and Lavertu 2012), however, much of the 
existing empirical research has operationalized performance information use as a 
single concept, rather than as a strategy that managers might be more or less likely 
to employ for various purposes.  This study seeks to make an important 
contribution to this gap in the literature by evaluating organizational use of 
performance information, both as a single concept, and disaggregated by various 
administrative functions.  
Using Data for Performance at US Public Universities 
 The data for this chapter come from a variety of sources.  Most notably, this 
chapter uses the same survey of presidents at public universities that I discussed in 
the previous chapter.  Whereas Chapter 4 was primarily concerned about 
perceptions about external accountability efforts, however, this chapter focuses on a 
series of items aimed at understanding the extent to which public universities 
employ performance management strategies and use performance data within the 
organization to guide decisions and improve performance.  More specifically, the 
survey asked respondents to assess their institution’s use of performance data for 
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tasks ranging from the evaluation of teaching and research ability of faculty and 
instructors, to identifying organizational strengths, to engaging external 
stakeholders about the value produced by the university.  Table 5.1 provides 
information about the item wording as well as the mean response for each item.  
Table 5.1: How Much Do Public Universities Use Performance Data? 
Item (1=Strongly Disagree;7=Strongly Agree) 
Mean  Variable  
Name 
My institution uses performance data to improve 
overall decision making. 
5.66 DECISIONS 
My university uses performance data to help identify 
areas that can be improved or made more efficient. 
5.64 IDENTIFY 
My university uses performance data to show outside 
stakeholders and political actors what we produce 
with revenues we have.  
5.23 STAKEHOLDERS 
Overall, managers at my university use performance 
data on a regular basis. 
5.15 REGULAR 
My university uses performance data to track and 
assess the teaching ability of faculty and instructors 
within each department. 
4.96 TEACHING 
My university uses performance data to help 
managers oversee employees and hold them and 
accountability for their performance.  
4.92 OVERSEE 
Deans at my university are evaluated based on their 
performance with respect to specific goals and 
targets. 
4.91 DEANS 
Within each department at my university, there are 
regular schedules and routines for reporting and 
analyzing performance data. 
4.88 ROUTINES 
My university uses performance data to track and 
assess the research productivity of faculty and 
instructors within each department. 
4.72 RESEARCH 
 
Overall, presidents at public universities indicate a relatively strong 
commitment to performance management.  Across the nine items represented in 
Table 5.1 (each of which is measured on a seven point scale where 1 equals 
strongly disagree and 7 equals strongly agree) mean responses ranged from a high 
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of 5.66 (my institution uses data to improve overall decision making) to a low of 
4.72 (my university uses performance data to track and assess the research 
productivity of faculty and instructors within each department).   Even for the 
lowest rated item (assessing research ability of faculty), over 64 percent of 
respondents answered with a 5 or above. 
Figure 5.1: Use of Performance Data at Public Universities 
 
 To get a better sense of the distribution of responses about performance data 
use, figure 5.1 illustrates a histogram for an index (Chronbach’s α = 0.822) that was 
created from the aforementioned items (mean = 5.12).  While the reliability of this 
index suggests that performance management can reasonably be operationalized as 
a single concept, it is also important to note that there are notable theoretical 
reasons to suspect that the causal factors influencing each form of use might differ 
somewhat (Behn 2003).  Thus, the empirical analysis that follows proceeds in two 
steps.  First, I examine factors that predict use of performance data in the aggregate 
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using an index4 created from all of the performance data use items.  Second, I 
examine use of performance data with respect to each of the nine individual items 
described above, which I classify into the three main categories of performance 
information use identified by Van Dooren, Bouckaert, and Halligan (2010): 1) 
Evaluation of employees, 2) Strategic Planning and Organizational Routines, and 
3) Engagement with External Stakeholders. 
Predictors of Performance Data Use 
 As previously discussed, there has been considerable empirical research on 
performance management and performance information use in recent years.  In 
large part, this literature has focused on variables from the external environment 
(policy context, political and bureaucratic oversight, and economic/fiscal situation), 
as well as variables dealing with the internal organizational climate (organizational 
capacity, mission), and leadership characteristics (managerial values, 
demographics, and experience), and my analysis follows this trend. 
External Environment: Accountability, Oversight, and Funding Instability 
 As chapters 3 and 4 demonstrated, higher education policy has witnessed a 
substantial shift in the relationship between state governments and public 
universities.  Increasingly, state governments are demanding that public institutions 
be accountable for performance related to things such as research productivity, 
student outcomes and cost-efficiency (Zumeta 2004).  One manifestation of this 
heightened focus on accountability has been the adoption of performance funding 
                                                 
4 While there is some criticism about the use of indices for multivariate analysis such as this, I ran 
alternate models using a principal component and a factor score created from the nine survey items, 
and results were substantively identical.  Thus, for ease of interpretation, I employ a simple index. 
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policies, which seek to directly link institutional funding to organizational 
performance (Burke 2002).   From a political control perspective, these external 
accountability systems provide an important mechanism for state governments that 
are attempting to influence the behavior of public managers (Meier and O’Toole 
2006; Thomas 2001).  Indeed, while these policies do not directly force institutions 
to alter their internal management practices, some have argued that, in addition to 
external accountability, they are often designed with a secondary purpose of 
pushing institutions towards greater use of performance management techniques 
(Dougherty and Reddy 2011; Ewell 1997, 2011).   
 I measure the strength of the performance regime in two ways.  First, I 
employ a dichotomous variable to identify states that have adopted a formal 
performance funding policy (see chapter 3 for a more extensive discussion of this 
variable and the way it is coded).  Second, given the findings from Chapter 4, 
which highlighted the importance of perceptions about accountability, I also 
include a measure for perceptions about the extent to which institutional funding 
depends on performance5.  If external systems of performance based accountability 
are effective at influencing organizational use of performance management, we 
should expect to find a positive relationship between the adoption of these systems 
and the use of performance data by public universities. 
                                                 
5 As discussed in chapter 4, there are some potential issues related to endogeneity regarding these 
two variables.  As one might expect, perceptions about the importance of funding are related to the 
adoption of performance funding policies.  To ensure that this did not bias my findings, I conducted 
a series of analyses involving alternate model specifications, and found that model results were 
substantively the same whether these two measures were included independently or jointly.   
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H1A: Public universities in states that have adopted performance 
funding policies will be more likely to use performance data for 
internal management. 
 
H1B: When the university president perceives a stronger relationship 
between performance and state appropriations, public universities will 
be more likely to use performance data for internal management. 
  
In addition to impacts on performance management that are directly related to 
the policy climate, scholars have found that characteristics of political principals 
can be an important predictor of information use (Ammons and Rivenbark 2008; 
Bourdeaux and Chikoto 2008; Bourdeaux 2006; Moynihan and Hawes 2012; 
Moynihan and Lavertu 2012).  As political principals exert greater influence on 
public organizations, research has generally found that use of performance 
management increases.   Given that public universities are largely accountable to 
state governments, I include a measure for the influence of state political actors.  
This measure was constructed by averaging responses to two items contained on 
the survey instrument that asked university presidents to rate (on a scale from 0 to 
10) the influence of the state legislature and the influence of the governor6.   
H2: Public universities will be more likely to use performance data for 
internal management when the university president perceives that 
political actors in their state have more influence.  
 
 In addition to political actors who hold elected office, such as the state 
legislature and the governor, public universities must also be accountable to 
                                                 
6 Though the legislature and executive branches are often treated separately in analyses of political 
influence, these items correlated relatively highly (r= 0.78), such that including them as separate 
measures introduced serious issues associated with multicolinearity, which are particularly 
problematic given the relatively small sample size.  Thus, for this analysis, I combine them into a 
single concept, which measures the influence of state political actors. 
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administrative bodies, such as regional accrediting agencies and statewide 
governing or coordinating boards.  Within higher education policy research, the 
degree of centralization in the state’s higher education governing and coordinating 
agencies has often been found to be important in understanding institutional 
behavior, particularly with respect to accountability relationships (Hearn and 
Griswold 1994; Knott and Payne 2004; Lowry 2001; McLendon, Hearn, and 
Deaton 2006; Nicholson-Crotty and Meier 2003; Richardson and Martinez 2009; 
Volkwein and Shaukat 1997; Volkwein and Tandberg 2008).   
I control for administrative structure by including a dichotomous variable to 
indicate whether the state has a centralized governing board, as opposed to a 
coordinating or planning agency. While I expect that governance structure matters, 
it is unclear whether greater centralization would be associated with higher or lower 
levels of use.  On the one hand, we might expect that more centralized agencies 
would be more effective at exerting influence on universities than would non-
centralized agencies, and that governing boards would thus be associated with 
greater use of performance data (Nicholson-Crotty and Meier 2003).  On the other 
hand, previous research on accountability in higher education has found that these 
centralized agencies often serve as a buffer against performance regimes, and thus 
tend to dampen the role of data driven accountability (McLendon, Hearn, and 
Deaton 2006).  Further, given that these more centralized bodies often have more 
full-time and professional staff, it may be the case that they have enhanced capacity 
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and expertise related to performance assessment, which could reduce the need for 
institutions to build their own systems. 
H3A: Public universities in states with centralized governing boards 
will be more likely to use performance data. 
 
H3B: Public universities in states with centralized governing boards 
will be less likely to use performance data 
 
Another form of regulatory oversight in higher education deals with the role 
of regional accrediting agencies.  These agencies are responsible for periodically 
reviewing university practices and degree programs, and have often been found to 
be influential in shaping university behavior (Spellings 2006).  I also include a 
series of dichotomous variables to measure potential differences in performance 
data use across universities that report to various regional accrediting agencies, 
though I have no clear hypotheses about which regions will be more or less likely 
to use data. 
 Finally, a third variable from the external environment that may impact 
organizational use of performance data is the uncertainty or volatility of important 
revenue streams.  A long line of research in public administration has found that 
organizations in more unstable environments need to adopt flexible and adaptive 
structures and routines in order to cope with uncertainty and rapid change 
(Mintzberg 1979; Thompson 1967; Wilson 1989).  Within higher education, one 
area of uncertainty that is likely to have a substantial impact on public universities 
relates to the stability of state appropriations.  As state governments have 
increasingly played a reduced role in supporting institutions of higher learning, 
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public universities have been forced to become more entrepreneurial and proactive 
in order to identify new streams of revenue and limit cost inefficiencies (Weisbrod, 
Ballou, and Asch 2008).  Thus, we might expect that universities will be more open 
to incorporating performance data and other administrative reforms when the 
funding environment becomes more volatile.  The survey asked presidents to rate 
the stability of state appropriations on a 1 to 7 scale, where 1 equals very volatile 
and 7 equals very stable.  I have reverse coded this question to create a measure of 
volatility in the external funding environment.  
H4: Public universities will be more likely to use performance data 
when the external funding environment is more volatile. 
 
Organizational Capacity and Mission 
In terms of variables from the organizational environment, I focus on two key 
factors.  First, I consider the impact of organizational capacity to collect and 
analyze performance data.  I measure organizational capacity for performance 
management with an index of three items (Chronbach’s α = 0.74) taken from the 
survey.  Respondents were asked to rate whether they agreed or disagreed with the 
following statements (1 – Strongly Disagree to 7- Strongly Agree), such that higher 
values indicate greater limitations in organizational capacity for performance 
management:  
It is difficult for my institution to fund systems (staff, computer 
databases, etc…) that are dedicated to tracking and analyzing 
performance data. 
 
There are other problems at my institution that we must address before 
we can worry about designing a new performance data system.  
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It has been difficult to figure out which indicators to measure and how 
to measure them. 
 
As previously discussed, performance management imposes substantial costs 
on organizations.  In order for performance data to be valid, reliable, timely, and 
useful for decision-making, organizations must dedicate a significant amount of 
money, time, and staff towards developing systems capable of tracking, storing, 
and analyzing internal metrics of performance (Hatry 2006; Keehley and 
Abercrombie 2008; Pulakos 2009).  In some cases, particularly when resources are 
limited and the capacity for administrative reform is constrained, these costs may 
be prohibitive (Berman and Wang 2000).  In the case of public colleges and 
universities, those institutions that have faced serious budget cuts, or that are 
chronically underfunded and understaffed, we might expect that performance data 
use will be less prevalent because managers have few, if any, resources to dedicate 
towards building administrative capacity.   
H5: Public universities will be less likely to use performance data when 
they have limited resources and organizational capacity for creating 
performance management systems.   
 
I also include a dichotomous variable for research universities to account for 
potentially important differences in organizational mission.  Given that these 
institutions dedicate a substantial portion of time and resources towards the 
production of research and scientific knowledge, often times with explicit the goal 
of improving their national ranking and prestige, we might expect that they will not 
only have a greater capacity to deal with the analytical costs associated with 
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performance management, but that they will also be more likely to see these types 
of data driven analytical efforts as useful, legitimate, and valuable. 
H6: Research universities will be more likely to use performance data 
than will other public universities. 
Leadership Characteristics: Managerial Values, Experience, and Demographics 
 The final category of variables that I include relate to the personal 
characteristics of organizational leaders (in this case, university presidents).  As the 
previous chapter discussed, organizational leaders have often been found to be 
highly influential in shaping the culture, routines, and practices of their agencies 
(Bennis and Nanus 1985; Dull 2009; Kaufman 1960; Meier and O’Toole 2006; 
Moore 1995; Moynihan and Ingraham 2004).  In thinking about the relevant 
personal characteristics for performance data use, I focus on three important 
factors: 1) political ideology, 2) experience, and 3) demographics.   
With regards to ideology, I expect that political conservatism will be 
positively related to use of performance data.  Just as performance management 
systems impose material costs on organizations, they also impose cognitive on 
individuals who must make decisions about which types of information are valid 
and reliable (Kroll and Vogel 2013).  Given that the performance management 
movement has often taken on a politically conservative valence, particularly due to 
its association with New Public Management and arguments related to privatization 
and market-based competition (Box 1999; Frederickson and Stazyk 2010; 
McLendon, Hearn, and Deaton 2006; Moynihan 2008; Pollitt 1993), I expect that 
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leaders who identify as political conservatives will be more likely to embrace 
performance data as a tool for administrative reform, whereas political liberals will 
be less likely to do so. 
H7: Public universities will be less likely to use performance data when 
the university president is politically conservative. 
  
Table 5.2: Summary Statistics (Chapter 5) 
 Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
General Use of Performance Data 5.12 0.97 1.56 7 
Performance Data Use For Personnel Evaluation 4.88 1.14 1.50 7 
Performance Data Use For Strategic Planning 5.33 1.01 1 7 
Performance Data Use For External Engagement 5.23 1.29 1 7 
Performance Funding Policy 0.26 0.44 0 1 
Funding Depends on Performance 2.64 2.34 0 8 
Influence of State Political Actors 4.70 2.17 0 10 
Governing Board Structure 0.30 0.46 0 1 
Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools 0.13 0.34 0 1 
New England Association of Schools and Colleges  0.05 0.22 0 1 
North Central Association of Colleges and Schools 0.41 0.49 0 1 
Northwest Comm. on Colleges and Universities 0.07 0.26 0 1 
Southern Association of Colleges and Schools 0.31 0.46 0 1 
Western Association of Schools and Colleges 0.03 0.17 0 1 
Volatility of State Appropriations 5.01 1.54 1 7 
Limited Organizational Capacity for PM 3.91 1.33 1 6.67 
Research (Carnegie) 0.29 0.46 0 1 
Political Conservatism 2.77 0.93 1 5 
Experience 5.91 4.54 0.17 21 
White 0.88 0.32 0 1 
 
 With respect to experience, previous research has found that more 
experienced managers are often better able to develop and use performance 
management strategies (Dull 2009; Folz, Abdelrazek, and Chung 2009; Ho 2006; 
Melkers and Willoughby 2005) I measure experience as the number of years that a 
respondent has been president at their current university.  Additionally, some 
scholars have found that demographic characteristics play an important role in 
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shaping managerial use of performance information, so I control for race, though I 
have no clear expectations about its impact on performance data use.   
H8: Public universities will be more likely to use performance data 
when the university president is more experienced. 
 
Summary statistics are presented in table 5.2.  As previously discussed, the 
empirical analysis for this study proceeds in two parts.  In the first stage, I explore 
predictors of general use of performance data, which I measure by taking an index 
of the nine survey items outlined in table 5.1.  In the second stage, I explore 
differences between alternative purposes for using performance data (evaluating 
employees, strategic planning and organizational learning, and external 
engagement).  
Findings – General Use of Performance Data 
 Turning first to general use of performance data, results are presented in 
table 5.3 and there are several important findings.  Contrary to the expectations 
established by proponents of performance based accountability, I find a negative 
relationship between use of performance data for internal management and the 
presence of an external performance funding policy.  All else equal, institutions in 
states with performance funding policies scored 0.55 points lower on the data use 
index than institutions in states without these policies.  Given the findings of 
previous work on performance based accountability (Fryar 2011; Sanford and 
Hunter 2010; Shin and Milton 2004; Shin 2010; Volkwein and Tandberg 2008), 
which largely suggest that these performance funding policies have been ineffective 
in a variety of areas, this negative result is not necessarily unexpected.  One 
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possible explanation is that performance management has backfired in these states 
because perceptions about the ineffectiveness of external systems of accountability 
have translated into lowered expectations about the extent to which performance 
data and performance management are appropriate and useful in higher education.   
Table 5.3: Use of Performance Data and Performance Management Strategies 
 β T 
Performance Based Policy Environment   
Performance Funding Policy -0.553* (-2.42) 
Funding Depends on Performance 0.052 (1.34) 
   
Oversight and Regional Accreditation   
Influence of State Political Actors 0.061+ (1.74) 
Centralized Governing Board  -0.549* (-2.05) 
   
New England Association of Schools and Colleges  -0.943* (-2.03) 
North Central Association of Colleges and Schools -0.348 (-1.24) 
Northwest Commission on Colleges and Universities 0.361 (0.97) 
Southern Association of Colleges and Schools -0.268 (-0.94) 
Western Association of Schools and Colleges -1.283+ (-1.66) 
   
Stability of Funding Environment   
Volatility of State Appropriations 0.138* (2.20) 
   
Organizational Capacity and Mission   
Limited Org. Capacity for PM -0.146* (-2.43) 
Research (Carnegie) 0.464* (2.32) 
   
Managerial Characteristics   
Political Conservatism 0.206* (2.58) 
Experience 0.010 (0.45) 
White -0.188 (-0.74) 
   
Constant 4.569*** (8.91) 
Observations 128 
0.197 Adjusted R2 
t statistics in parentheses 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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While it is beyond the scope of this study to determine whether this is due 
to problems in policy design and implementation that are specific to the actual 
policies that have been adopted, as opposed to faulty causal logic regarding 
performance management as a general concept, it is important to note that we see 
no such negative relationship when looking at perceptions about the importance of 
funding.  Indeed, the coefficient on perceptions about the importance of funding for 
performance is actually positive, though it fails to achieve statistical significance.  
This suggests that negative experiences with performance funding policies may be 
more related issues of failed implementation, and that future attempts at 
performance based accountability might be more successful if the policies are 
designed and implemented in ways foster greater acceptance on the part of 
university administrators. 
With regards to oversight and accreditation, I find that universities are more 
likely to use performance data when political actors (the legislature and governor) 
in their state are more influential, but that they are less likely to do so when the 
state has a centralized governing board.  For political oversight, a one standard 
deviation increase in legislative and governor influence is associated with a 0.13 
increase in the performance use index (2.17 * 0.061), whereas institutions in states 
with governing boards score 0.55 points lower.  The negative relationship for 
centralized governing boards indicates that, as McLendon et al (2006) find, these 
boards often serve as a buffer to protect public institutions against external 
pressures.   
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I also find significant relationships between regional accreditation agencies 
and the use of performance data.  Both the New England Association of Schools 
and Colleges and the Western Association of Schools and Colleges are associated 
with lower performance data use than are other regional accreditation agencies (the 
Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools serves as the referent group).  
And finally, in terms of variables from the external environment, I find a positive 
relationship between volatility in the funding climate and the use of performance 
data.  A one standard deviation increase in perceptions about the volatility of state 
appropriations is associated with an increase of approximately 0.21 on the 
performance data use index (1.54 * 0.138 = 0.213). 
In terms of the two variables for organizational capacity and mission, I find 
that organizations that with greater limitations in their capacity to track and analyze 
data are less likely to use performance management, while research universities are 
more likely to do so.  For organizational capacity, a one standard deviation increase 
in limitations on capacity is associated with a decrease of approximately 0.19 on 
the data use index (1.33 * -0.146 = 0.194).  Conversely, public research universities 
score about 0.46 points higher on the use index than do other public universities, all 
else equal.   
Finally, I find a positive relationship between the political conservatism of 
the organizational leader (i.e. university president) and the use of performance data.  
A one standard deviation increase in political conservatism is associated with an 
increase of 0.19 on the data use index (0.93 * 0.206 = 0.192).  Contrary to previous 
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research, I find no relationship between managerial experience and propensity to 
use performance information. 
Findings –Performance Data Use for Evaluation, Planning, and Engagement 
In the second stage of this analysis, I move beyond performance management 
as a general concept to explore the ways that organizations use performance data to 
achieve different goals.  To do so, I categorize the nine survey items used earlier 
according to the three primary purposes for performance management (evaluating 
employees, strategic planning and organizational learning, and engaging external 
stakeholders) that have been outlined by existing literature which resulted in the 
creation of two additional indices.  The first index, which measures data use for the 
purpose evaluating employees, was created by averaging responses to four items 
(TEACHING, RESEARCH, OVERSEE, DEANS) personnel assessment 
(Chronbach’s α = 0.79).  For data use regarding strategic planning and 
organizational learning, I combined an additional four items (DECISIONS, 
IDENTIFY, ROUTINES, REGULAR) from the survey that relate to data as a tool 
for strategic planning (Chronbach’s α = 0.82).  Finally, the survey contained one 
item (STAKHOLDERS) that asked about use of performance data for interacting 
with external actors, which I employ to examine performance data use related to 
stakeholder engagement7. 
Table 5.4 lists the findings for these three types of performance management 
(using the same set of independent variables that were employed for the first stage),  
                                                 
7 I ran ordered logistic regression for this model, but the findings were substantively the same so I 
present OLS results for ease of interpretation. 
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Table 5.4: Using Performance Data for Evaluation, Planning, and Engagement 
 Evaluate Plan Engage 
Performance Based Accountability    
Performance Funding Policy -0.633* -0.454+ -0.591* 
 (-2.17) (-1.93) (-2.04) 
Funding Depends on Performance 0.068 0.029 0.064 
 (1.54) (0.70) (1.29) 
Oversight and Accreditation    
Influence of State Political Actors 0.044 0.067+ 0.118* 
 (1.06) (1.86) (2.15) 
Centralized Governing Board -0.461 -0.662* -0.455 
 (-1.63) (-2.26) (-1.31) 
New England Assoc. of Schools and Colleges  -0.973+ -0.869* -0.220 
 (-1.87) (-2.04) (-0.33) 
North Central Assoc. of Colleges and Schools -0.646+ -0.125 -0.033 
 (-1.96) (-0.43) (-0.08) 
Northwest Comm. on Colleges and 
Universities 
0.031 0.531 1.037+ 
 (0.08) (1.27) (1.94) 
Southern Assoc. of Colleges and Schools -0.495 -0.106 0.007 
 (-1.58) (-0.33) (0.02) 
Western Assoc. of Schools and Colleges -1.145 -1.346+ -1.488* 
 (-1.42) (-1.69) (-1.99) 
Stability of Funding Environment    
Volatility of State Appropriations 0.136* 0.136+ 0.137 
 (2.08) (1.91) (1.49) 
Organizational Capacity and Mission    
Limited Org. Capacity for PM -0.175* -0.144* -0.070 
 (-2.35) (-2.35) (-0.82) 
Research (Carnegie) 0.561* 0.293 0.688** 
 (2.47) (1.38) (2.72) 
Managerial Values and Demographics    
Political Conservatism 0.214* 0.181* 0.253+ 
 (2.17) (2.14) (1.94) 
Experience 0.013 0.002 0.027 
 (0.54) (0.09) (1.15) 
White -0.055 -0.193 -0.637* 
 (-0.20) (-0.71) (-2.14) 
Constant 4.533*** 4.824*** 3.887*** 
 (7.15) (8.80) (4.89) 
Observations 128 129 129 
Adjusted R2 0.145 0.166 0.148 
t statistics in parentheses 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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and while some of the results are consistent with earlier findings for general use of 
performance data, several important differences emerge between models related to 
use for evaluation, planning, and engagement.  One area where I observe notable 
differences is with respect to the effect of influential state politicians.  Whereas 
there is no statistically significant relationship between political influence and use 
of performance data for evaluation of employees, I find positive and significant 
relationships with respect to data use for both planning and for stakeholder 
engagement.  Further, the size of the coefficient is approximately twice as large for 
external engagement when compared to strategic planning.  Conversely, I find that 
volatility of the external funding environment and organizational capacity are 
significant predictors of data use related to evaluation and planning, but not for 
stakeholder engagement.  Additionally, whereas centralized governance structure is 
related to strategic planning but not the other two types of use, research mission is 
related to use for evaluation and stakeholder engagement, but not for strategic 
planning.  Taken together, these results suggest that performance management is 
indeed more complex than a single aggregate measure would imply, and that 
organizations are pushed, by a variety of forces, to use data for distinct purposes.    
Discussion and Implications 
Taken together, the findings from this study highlight a number of 
important implications for performance management and the use of data within 
public agencies.   
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One particularly interesting finding was the fact that political influence is 
associated with higher use for stakeholder engagement, but not for evaluating 
employees.  This has important implications for the role of external accountability 
in shaping administrative reform.  Whereas the goal of external oversight is often to 
shape administrative behavior, particularly related to internal management and 
service delivery, these results suggest that the primary effect such efforts have on 
public organizations is to cause them to re-shape the kinds of information they 
provide to political principals.  Thus, rather than increasing the amount of political 
control that electoral institutions exercise over public agencies, increased oversight 
efforts may instead be deflected by agencies that strategically use data to buffer 
against hostile political efforts.  Given that much of the focus in the performance 
management literature has treated public agencies as relatively passive actors who 
must adapt and absorb the impacts of performance based accountability, these 
results suggest that future research would be well-served to think more extensively 
about the ways that agencies proactively use data as a tool to ward off adversarial 
coalitions and political principals. 
 Secondly, I find that organizational use of performance data is strongly 
related to the political ideology of agency leaders.  Given that performance 
management reforms are often promoted as a value-neutral alternative to politics 
and partisanship, this finding has major implications for the way we think about 
these reforms.  Rather than removing values or biases from the public sector, as 
proponents often claim, performance management instead appears to be vehicle 
125 
through which personal preferences and predispositions of bureaucrats and 
organizational leaders can influence implementation.   
One interesting question for future research is to explore whether this is 
related to underlying worldviews related to privatization and a preference for 
market-based mechanisms of competition and accountability (as much of the 
previous literature on performance management suggests), or whether it is instead 
related to political rhetoric and partisan debates about these techniques that have 
colored the way people think about data-driven management.  Are conservatives 
more likely to use data because performance management is largely consistent with 
an underlying worldview, or is this instead related to cues they receive from other 
political elites?  A potential way to get at this question would be to explore 
differences in propensity to use data that speak to various values and definitions of 
performance (i.e. equity versus efficiency), particularly as this relates to the broad 
worldviews and normative values for various actors within the political system.  
Thus, while this study focused on differential use according to tasks or activities, it 
is important that future work also think about the role that the content and design of 
performance metrics and data might play in shaping use. 
Finally, the importance of organizational capacity for performance 
information use is a key finding that has major implications for future performance 
oriented reforms.  Often times when we see movements to shift towards a more 
performance based accountability system, the discussion centers on perceptions 
that public agencies are inherently inefficient and resistant to change.  As a result, 
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many recent experiences with accountability have tended to focus more on punitive 
mechanisms for underperforming organizations, without also considering the need 
to improve organizational capacity.  Within the context of performance 
management, the costs that these systems impose on agencies and administrators is 
often discounted by external actors, which can result in unrealistic expectations or 
pressures regarding the propensity for data driven reforms to improve performance.  
Moving forward, future efforts at encouraging performance information use within 
public agencies need to seriously consider ways to build organizational capacity 
and provide the resources and expertise needed to make use of data.   
Conclusion 
 As performance management has become increasingly prevalent 
within the public sector, questions about the ways that the data produced by 
these systems are used have come to the fore.  This chapter focused on data 
use within public colleges and universities, and found that these management 
systems were influenced by external pressures and political conditions in 
combination with internal organizational characteristics and leadership 
values.  It also extended the literature on performance information use by 
empirically exploring performance management as a multi-dimensional 
concept that influences distinct management tasks and purposes.  In doing so, 
I find notable differences in the factors that are associated with greater use of 
different forms of performance data, particularly with respect to use aimed at 
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 Chapter VI: Conclusion 
Public organizations exist in an environment wherein citizens and the media 
are increasingly distrustful of government.  Further, as many people have come to 
view the public sector as inefficient, ineffective, and unable to adapt to the needs of 
modern society, market-based ideologies that favor privatization, competition, and 
results-based management have become prominent in recent years.  At the same 
time, the rise of information technologies and advanced computing systems has 
made it easier to track, store, and analyze data than it has ever been in the past. As a 
result of these trends, the performance management “movement” has become 
ubiquitous in the public sector (Radin 2000).  Perhaps nowhere has this been more 
evident than in higher education. Public colleges and universities once held a 
privileged position in American politics, and were celebrated as shining examples 
of research, innovation, and high-quality undergraduate education. Today, 
however, they often confront skepticism about their value to the public, hostility 
about rising costs, and frustration with lagging performance.  This has created the 
demand for increased oversight and accountability, and universities have been 
forced to adapt (Zumeta 2001).   
Unfortunately, despite heated debate about the merits of this performance 
based approach, both within the practitioner community and within the scholarly 
literature, serious questions remain about the impacts that this “movement” has had 
on management.  Public agencies expend considerable time and energy on the 
collection and reporting of performance metrics, but it is often unclear how (or 
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whether) this information is used by decision-makers.  Given that this data must be 
interpreted and acted on by human actors in order to have an impact, this represents 
an important limitation.  After all, if performance information is not used, or if it is 
used in dysfunctional ways, then regardless of how helpful or insightful the data 
that these systems generate might be, performance management is destined to be an 
exercise in futility.  Thus, it is critical that we understand the causal mechanisms by 
which performance data and performance management impact public agencies and 
the administrators who staff them.  Collectively, the chapters in this dissertation 
contribute to a relatively new, but growing, body of theoretically grounded 
empirical research on the role of performance data in shaping decisions and 
behavior in both policymaking and public management.  
Implications for Theory: Performance Management and External Control 
 One of the major debates about public management and the role of 
performance data in governance centers around the efficacy of externally imposed 
accountability mechanisms.  One the one hand, many scholars (mainly political 
scientists) have argued that top-down structures that constrain discretion and 
employ strong material rewards and punishments to induce desirable administrative 
behavior are desirable (Finer 1941; Macdonald 2010; MacDonald 2007; Mathew D. 
McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987; Mathew D. McCubbins 1985; Matthew D. 
McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1989; Scholz and Wood 1998).  From this 
perspective, performance management is an important tool that external actors can 
use in order to decrease information asymmetries and to restructure the financial 
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incentives that public managers face.  Ideally, managers will respond to these 
external pressures by cutting waste and inefficiency, and pushing additional 
resources towards activities to help accomplish objectives that are important to 
political principals (Thomas 2001). 
A competing view (largely held by public administration theorists), holds 
that this top-down approach is inherently flawed because it ignores the important 
role of internal values in shaping administrative behavior (Carpenter 2001; Clinton 
et al. 2012; Friedrich 1940; Lipsky 1980; Meier and O’Toole 2006; Miller and 
Whitford 2007; Redford 1969).  Scholars who subscribe to this viewpoint argue 
that when external accountability structures are imposed on public agencies without 
appropriate attention to the perceptions and beliefs of administrators, they are likely 
to result in severe dysfunction.  If administrative actors perceive these external 
policies as illegitimate or without substance, they are likely to resist or undermine 
top-down structures.  From this perspective, performance management represents a 
potential hazard because it can threaten the internal ethics and values of public 
managers.  
 The findings from chapters 3, 4, and 5 all speak to this debate in important 
ways.  One of the major conclusions from chapter 3 was that performance 
management has largely been ineffective as a tool for restructuring financial 
incentives in higher education.  Similarly, chapters 4 and 5 found that performance 
funding policies were not able to shape perceptions about the legitimacy of 
performance based accountability, nor were they able to induce greater use of 
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performance data for internal management.  This is likely due to a couple of 
factors.  First, it is important to remember that public colleges and universities are 
already subject to a variety of overlapping accountability mechanisms, including 
formal accreditation and bureaucratic oversight as well as more informal ties to 
political actors in state legislatures and governor’s offices.  Thus, performance 
management policies are simply another layer in the governance of higher 
education, and their effects are often dampened or negated by countervailing 
forces.  Centralized governing boards, for example, have been found to buffer 
public colleges against accountability efforts (McLendon, Hearn, and Deaton 
2006).  Similarly, politicians are often too concerned with potential electoral 
consequences associated with reducing funding to institutions in their district to 
impose serious budget cuts, even when universities underperform (Lowry 2001; 
McLendon, Mokher, and Doyle 2009) 
 Second, the multidimensional nature of performance in higher education 
makes it difficult to impose strong external controls.  Public universities are valued 
not only for undergraduate instruction and workforce preparation, but also for their 
capacity to engage in public service for the community, to promote diversity and 
tolerance, and to generate research and scientific breakthroughs that benefit society 
as a whole.  As a result, it is difficult for any single measure, or even collection of 
measures, to adequately capture institutional “performance” in a comprehensive 
manner.  Rather, what states have tended to do is create funding policies that 
reward performance along several dimensions, and as a result virtually every 
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institution in the state has some measure of performance they can use to qualify for 
additional funding (Dougherty and Reddy 2011).  Thus, performance funding 
policies have been less about restructuring incentives, and more about codifying 
funding priorities that already existed in the state, at least to some extent. 
 Despite this rather pessimistic view of performance management, I also find 
evidence that these programs can, in fact have desirable effects on public 
administrators, though they often do so through more indirect means.  Chapter 3 
found that, despite the lack of financial incentives or punishments, public 
universities nevertheless respond to performance policies by shifting expenditures 
towards activities that political principals desire (research as opposed to 
instruction).  This is largely due to a combination of symbolic meaning, and shifts 
in perceptions of administrators about the role of accountability.  This implies that 
in order to understand the impact of top-down accountability structures, we should 
not only consider their efficacy in terms of direct influences on public 
organizations, but we must also account for their capacity to indirectly shift 
perceptions.   
Chapter 4 examines this issue directly, and finds that perceptions about the 
normative legitimacy of performance based funding were largely driven by beliefs 
about the extent to which organizational funding already depended on performance.  
While the performance funding policies themselves did not move beliefs about the 
desirability of performance based accountability, managers who perceived that their 
organization’s funding was largely dependent on performance were, in fact, more 
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positive about accountability.  Moreover, beliefs about the extent to which 
performance was important for institutional funding were positively correlated with 
the existence of performance funding policies.  Thus, while the direct effect of 
performance funding is negligible (and is, in fact, often negative), it would be a 
mistake to completely discount the capacity for these policies to have important 
impacts on public management.  
Finally, in keeping with much of the literature on bureaucratic values, I find 
that the personal beliefs and values of organizational leaders (as measured by the 
political ideology of university presidents) is often a good predictor of the reception 
that performance management receives within organizations.  This is true not only 
with regards to perceptions about the legitimacy of performance based 
accountability, as chapter 4 showed, but also with regards to use of performance 
data for internal management, as chapter 5 illustrated.  These findings re-enforce an 
existing literature on the importance of accounting for bureaucratic values and 
suggest that future research in this area should continue to explore ways to measure 
these values directly, rather than relying on proxy measures such as race and 
demographics.  In terms of the literature on performance management, these 
findings also confirm previous research that has found New Public Management 
and performance based accountability, which are often billed as value neutral, 
“good government” reforms, are instead highly politicized and driven by 
ideological motivations and biases. 
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 In addition to this debate about external accountability and the tension 
between political control and administrative discretion, this dissertation also speaks 
to important issues within the literature on public management.  Most notably, 
chapter 5 has direct implications for research on information use within public 
organizations.  Not only do I find empirical support for many of factors that 
previous research has suggested should be important for performance information 
use, but I also extend this research by examining use across the three major 
purposes of performance management.  One of the major takeaways from this 
chapter is that performance management requires organizations to make 
investments in order to build analytical capacity.  Thus, if we want to understand 
why some organizations use performance data while others do not, it is important 
to consider factors that influence both ability to bear the costs of investment (such 
as the availability of resources to dedicate to performance management), as well as 
the goals that performance management is intended to achieve. 
Implications for Practitioners 
 This dissertation also has important implications for practitioners and 
policymakers who are interested in implementing performance management 
policies and systems.  In particular, chapters 4 and 5 suggest that policymakers 
should be especially attuned to the potential for dysfunctional use of performance 
information within the political process to have negative impacts over the long-
term.  As public administrators perceive that performance information is 
manipulated or used primarily for posturing rather than to substantively improve 
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policy, they are much less likely to take performance based accountability seriously 
or to view it as legitimate.  Given that elected officials often face strong incentives 
in the short-term to use performance data as a means for achieving political ends, 
this represents a significant challenge.   
While it is beyond the scope of this project to assess the mechanisms that 
prevent dysfunctional use of performance data (but see (Moynihan 2006, 2008) for 
a discussion of some potential ways to make performance management less 
contentious), one clear implication of this is that policymakers should think about 
performance management as a tool that can only be as effective as the surrounding 
political climate.  Thus, as policymakers consider implementing performance 
oriented reforms, they should also be careful to address underlying issues with the 
political climate.  In other words, while performance management is often billed as 
a tool to combat gridlock and polarization, it is more likely to exacerbate these 
issues rather than solve them. 
A second important implication for policymakers relates to the importance 
of organizational capacity.  Often times performance based accountability policies 
are adopted as a way to try and spur organizational improvement, particularly for 
agencies that are struggling to achieve important goals and objectives.  
Unfortunately, these policies can sometimes create an environment where 
organizations are punished for poor performance, without receiving adequate 
resources to address important problems.  As chapter 5 demonstrates, one of the 
key factors in driving use of performance data is the extent to which organizations 
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have the capacity to build these systems.  For many universities, leaders might 
prefer to employ performance management practices, but they are unable to do so 
because they have more pressing concerns.  For presidents institutions that are 
struggling to fund basic services, such as academic counseling or full-time faculty, 
investments in expensive data management systems are likely to be treated as 
luxury items that be cut in times of fiscal distress.  Unfortunately, the institutions 
that struggle to fund performance management systems are often the very same 
universities where student outcomes are lagging and where performance 
management could be of substantial benefit. 
If the goal of performance based accountability is to spur organizational 
improvement, then it is important that policymakers also be willing to address 
limitations in organizational capacity.  This means that performance policies should 
not only be crafted in ways that promote equity and allow for differential treatment 
of organizations based on context (i.e. based on some comparison with peer 
institutions in terms of mission, selectivity, and student body composition), but that 
they should also be accompanied with additional funding to build administrative 
capacity.  Unfortunately, the current fiscal environment for higher education has 
seen substantial disinvestment on the part of state governments, which has worked 
to substantially reduce institutional resources, particularly at open-enrollment 
teaching oriented colleges (Cheslock and Gianneschi 2008; Zumeta et al. 2012).  
Nevertheless, despite the fact that performance management is often accompanied 
by aggressive political rhetoric about “taking on” the bureaucracy and holding 
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“lazy” or “incompetent” employees accountable for their actions, these policies are 
likely to be much more effective when the relationship between public agencies and 
political institutions is more supportive and less adversarial. 
Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
As previously stated, one of the major conclusions from this dissertation is 
that performance funding policies in higher education have been largely ineffective 
as a tool for improving governance.  Interestingly, however, I also find that 
university leaders are relatively open to moving towards a more performance 
oriented funding scheme, and that heightened perceptions about the importance of 
performance in the funding process are often positively related to administrative 
responses.  This suggests that the failure of performance based funding in higher 
education may have more to do with inadequacy related to the specific policies that 
have been adopted, rather than an inherent flaw in performance based 
accountability as a general concept.   
Unfortunately, it remains unclear whether these failures are due to problems 
related to the adoption process, whether they are driven by issues related to policy 
design and the selection and specification of performance metrics, or whether it has 
to do with the failure of these policies to deliver substantial financial rewards and 
incentives.  In other words, although this dissertation provides robust evidence that 
performance based funding policies have been ineffective, we still know little about 
why, exactly, they have not worked.  Future research should examine these issues 
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carefully so that we can gain a better understanding of the mechanisms by which 
external based accountability policies can be improved.   
Another important area for future research relates to the ways that citizens 
use performance data.  Given the fact that many of these regimes are designed with 
an explicit goal of making government more transparent and increasing democratic 
oversight, it is important that we develop a more extensive understanding about 
whether they have been effective at doing so.  Unfortunately, we know very little 
how people use performance information in their capacity as citizens (James 2011; 
Pollitt 2006a).  As James (2011) points out, this is problematic, because a great deal 
of empirical and normative work in political science suggests that citizens need 
accurate information about their government its performance in order for 
democracy to function properly (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1997; Downs 1957; 
Zaller 1992).  
Some preliminary studies suggest that voters place little emphasis on 
performance metrics as a mechanism for assessing incumbent candidates, and that 
as a result, there are few electoral incentives associated with performance 
management (Hood and Dixon 2010; James and John 2007; James 2011).  On the 
other hand scholars have also found that providing citizens with objective 
information regarding agency performance can have a meaningful impact on 
support for public policies, and assessments of government performance (James 
2011; Kelly 2011).  Thus, it appears that information about the performance of 
public agencies can have meaningful impacts on public opinion and citizen 
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perceptions regarding the legitimacy and effectiveness of public policy, but it 
remains unclear exactly how (or if) it results in any discernible change in the 
behavior of lawmakers or agency officials.   
Finally, this dissertation project has primarily focused on performance as a 
general concept, and has largely relied on existing policies to define the various 
dimensions of performance.  There is considerable room, however, for future 
research to use performance management as a way to gain better leverage about 
normative issues related to performance.  As much of the technical, “how to” 
literature on performance management notes, performance can be measured in a 
variety of ways (Hatry 2006).  These include measures of a particular outcome in 
the aggregate, traditional cost-efficiency measures that track how much “bang for 
the buck” a particular program or activity produces, measures that focus on equity, 
fairness, and diversity, and perhaps even metrics related to due process and 
Constitutionality.  Given that performance based accountability is largely built 
around the idea of enhancing democracy, it is important that we gain a better sense 
for the preferences people have for these (often) competing dimensions of 
performance.  By examining the ways that actors across a variety of institutional 
settings and with a diversity of worldviews interpret and interact with performance 
data, there is tremendous potential to develop a better understanding of the process 
by which beliefs about the normative importance of various dimensions of 
performance are formed. 
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 Performance management and the use of quantitative data for decision-
making have become omnipresent in the public sector.  Moreover, despite heated 
debate about the value of performance based accountability and performance 
management, we are unlikely to see this trend fade anytime in the near future.   As 
a result, questions about the use of this information and its impacts on the 
policymaking process are incredibly important, for both scholars and practitioners.  
Ultimately, the success or failure of performance management, and to a large 
extent, the public sector, hinges on whether we can continue to make progress in 
developing theory driven empirical research to explore crucial causal mechanisms 
related to the ways that people and individuals process and use performance data.  
While this dissertation makes a number of important contributions to our 
understanding of some of these processes, there remains much work to do.  My 
sincere hope is that this project will not only motivate continued attention and 
research about these topics, but that it will also help lay the groundwork for 
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 Appendix A: Survey of University Presidents and 
Chancellors8 
As mentioned in the cover letter, many states link some portion of higher education 
appropriations to quantifiable performance measures, which can vary tremendously.  Given 
the variation, it is difficult to capture all of the possibilities in a fixed format survey.  For 
this study, when we speak of performance data, we are referring to quantitative measures 
that capture some dimension of student outcomes. 
 
 
How much does the amount of funding that your institution receives in state appropriations 
depend on performance?  
Not at all                Somewhat                                  Completely 
0 1   2  3  4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
How much should the amount of funding that your institution receives from state 
appropriations depend on performance?  
    Not at all                Somewhat                                  Completely 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
How involved are you in helping to design policies that use data regarding the performance 
of public institutions for budgeting, accountability, and oversight in your state?  
    Not Involved                                Somewhat                           Extremely  
        At All         Involved                            Involved 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
How involved are other campus leaders and university representatives in helping to design 
policies that use data regarding the performance of public institutions for budgeting, 
accountability, and oversight in your state?  
Not Involved                                Somewhat                           Extremely  
        At All         Involved                            Involved 





                                                 
8 Please note that some of the page formatting and arrangements of tables has been altered from the 
original survey instrument to comply with the Graduate College’s margin/spacing requirements. 
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Now please think about the role that performance information plays in higher education 
policymaking in your state, and indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following 
statements. 
                Strongly                  Strongly  
                                       Disagree       Agree 
Political leaders in my state often use performance data 
when crafting the budget. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Political leaders in my state often use performance data 
when they make new policies that affect higher education. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Citizens in my state are well informed about my institution’s 
actual performance.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
If people want to, they can manipulate performance data to 
make it say whatever they want. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Performance data is used more for political posturing than it 
is for objectively assessing institutional productivity. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I worry that performance data will be used to unfairly 
punish my institution. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I often use performance data as a way to demonstrate my 
institution’s value when dealing with political actors who 
are hostile towards higher education. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The accountability system in my state is fair for everybody. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The accountability system in my state has improved the 
quality of higher education. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Please indicate the extent to which you believe the following indicators are legitimate 
performance measures for your institution. 
            Not Legitimate                                           Completely  
          At All                 Legitimate 
Graduation Rates 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Retention Rates 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Bachelor’s Degree Completions 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Class Sizes/Student to Faculty Member 
Ratio 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Student Achievement on National 
Learning Assessment Exams 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Tuition and Fees Costs for In-State 
Students 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Minority Student Outcomes 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Student Diversity 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Faculty Diversity 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
US News and World Report Rankings  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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Competitive/External Research Grants 
Awarded 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
Now, thinking about those same indicators, please indicate the extent to which you believe 
they are important to political leaders in your state. 
            Not Legitimate                                           Completely  
          At All                 Legitimate 
Graduation Rates 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Retention Rates 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Bachelor’s Degree Completions 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Class Sizes/Student to Faculty Member 
Ratio 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Student Achievement on National 
Learning Assessment Exams 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Tuition and Fees Costs for In-State 
Students 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Minority Student Outcomes 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Student Diversity 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Faculty Diversity 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
US News and World Report Rankings  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Competitive/External Research Grants 
Awarded 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
How would you describe the political climate in your state as it relates to higher education 
and public universities?  
     Very Hostile                       Neutral       Very Supportive 




Much of the policy debate has focused on graduation rates.  Please indicate whether you 
agree or disagree with the following statements. 
                Strongly                  Strongly  
                                       Disagree       Agree 
Graduation rates among at-risk students is an issue largely 
outside the abilities of the institution to influence. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Ultimately, the student is most responsible for his or her own 
success. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Poor preparation in K-12 is to blame for the poor performance of 
students in public colleges and universities, and not 
postsecondary institutions. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The expectations of lawmakers and state higher education 
officials regarding graduation rates are unrealistic. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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State Appropriations and Privatization 
 
As state funding for higher education has declined in recent years, there has been a lot of 
talk about the potential for some public universities to convert to private not-for profit 
institutions.  Hypothetically, if your university were able to replace all state appropriations 
with increased revenues from other sources, how likely would you be to support a 
movement to convert your university to a private, non-profit institution? 
 Very Unlikely        Very Likely 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
If the state were to cut your institution’s appropriations by half, how likely is it that your 
institution would have to do the following things? 
                                                       Very Unlikely           Very Likely 
Cut Enrollment 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Raise Tuition 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Lower the Quality of Teaching 
Faculty 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Fire Faculty/Staff 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Eliminate 
Departments/Programs 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Reduce Extracurricular/Athletic 
Programs 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Shut Down 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
In thinking about long-range planning, would you consider the following sources of funds 
to be more volatile or more stable?     
        Very Volatile                            Very Stable 
State Appropriations 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Tuition Revenues 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Research/Grant Funding 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Private Donations/Endowments 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
Overall, how dependent are public universities (in general, not just your institution) on 
state governments? 
Not Dependent                             Completely  
 At All                  Dependent 





When it comes to workforce training and economic development, how dependent are state 
governments on public universities? 
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Not Dependent                             Completely  
 At All                  Dependent 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following statements: 
             Strongly                     Strongly  
                                     Disagree       Agree 
When people think of our state, they often think of my 
university. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
When people think of our city/community, they often think of 
my university. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Serving our state is a fundamental part of our mission that 
should take precedent over all other goals. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Students who want to stay in this geographic region have 
many other high-quality universities from which to choose 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Institutions in our state (or multi-institutional systems) must 
compete against each other for resources from the state 
government. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Universities must be more willing to cater to what students 
want if they are to remain solvent and relevant in today’s 
society. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
In order to maintain enrollment and student quality, my 
institution must be more proactive than others to recruit new 
students. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Deans (or equivalent) at my university have a great deal of 
discretion in managing the day to day operations of their 
departments/colleges. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
How well do you believe individuals in the following organizations understand the 
challenges that your institution faces? 
Not at all                        Completely                          
                                                   Understand                       
Board of Regents  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
System Office  N/A 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Coordinating/Governing Board/Planning 
Agency  
N/A 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
State Legislature   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Governor’s Office  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Regional Accreditation Agencies  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Congress  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Federal Agencies  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
How much influence do individuals in the following organizations have over the way you 
manage your institution?  
                                           No Influence              Complete Control                       
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Board of Regents  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
System Office  N/A 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Coordinating/Governing Board/Planning 
Agency  
N/A 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
State Legislature  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Governor’s Office  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Regional Accreditation Agencies  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Congress  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Federal Agencies  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following statements: 
              Strongly                    Strongly  
                           Disagree       Agree 
Generally, state actors do not interfere with the day-to-day 
operations of my university. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The best way for state policymakers to improve the quality of 
education in public universities is give public universities more 
latitude and reduce oversight. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Regional accreditation agencies provide all of the oversight 
necessary to appropriately regulate higher education.  There is 
no need for additional oversight from state actors. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Tenure protects unproductive faculty more often than it protects 
those who are targeted for their individual beliefs and activities. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Even if tenure is abused sometimes, the fundamental value of 
academic freedom requires that we protect it at all costs. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Performance Information and Internal Management 
For the next set of questions, please think about the role that performance information 
plays at your institution for issues related to internal management.  Please indicate whether 
you agree or disagree with the following statements. 
            Strongly                      Strongly  
                         Disagree       Agree 
My university uses performance data to track and assess the 
teaching ability of faculty and instructors within each 
department. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
My university uses performance data to track and assess the 
research productivity of faculty and instructors within each 
department. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Within each department at my university, there are regular 
schedules and routines for reporting and analyzing 
performance data. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Deans at my university are evaluated based on their 
performance with respect to specific goals and targets. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
My university uses performance data to show outside 
stakeholders and political actors what we produce with 
revenues we have.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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My university uses performance data to help identify areas that 
can be improved or made more efficient. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
My university uses performance data to help managers oversee 
employees and hold them and accountability for their 
performance.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
My institution uses performance data to improve overall 
decision making. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Overall, managers at my university use performance data on a 
regular basis. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
               
      Strongly                     Strongly  
             Disagree     Agree 
It is difficult for my institution to fund systems (staff, computer 
databases, etc…) that are dedicated to tracking and analyzing 
performance data. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
There are other problems at my institution that we must address 
before we can worry about designing a new performance data 
system. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Faculty members at my university are distrustful of 
performance management policies. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
It has been difficult to figure out which indicators to measure 
and how to measure them. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Many of the things that faculty and staff at my university do are 
simply not possible to measure quantitatively. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I worry that some people at my university will find ways to 
manipulate performance data in order to make them look better. 




Please indicate how frequently you interact with individuals in the following groups by 
placing a checkmark in the appropriate column: 
 
                                    Daily  2-5x/Week   Weekly   Monthly   Quarterly  Yearly   Never   NA  
Within the university 
Your administrative staff    [    ]          [    ]            [    ]   [    ]            [    ]       [    ]        [    ]     [    ]     
Provost                                [    ]          [    ]            [    ]   [    ]            [    ]       [    ]        [    ]     [    ]  
Deans and Directors            [    ]          [    ]            [    ]   [    ]            [    ]       [    ]        [    ]     [    ] 
Department Heads               [    ]          [    ]            [    ]   [    ]            [    ]       [    ]        [    ]     [    ] 
Business Affairs                  [    ]          [    ]            [    ]   [    ]            [    ]       [    ]        [    ]     [    ] 
Legal Affairs                       [    ]          [    ]            [    ]   [    ]            [    ]       [    ]        [    ]     [    ] 
Student Affairs                    [    ]          [    ]            [    ]   [    ]            [    ]       [    ]        [    ]     [    ]  
Development, Fundraising  [    ]          [    ]            [    ]          [    ]           [    ]       [    ]        [    ]     [    ] 
External Affairs/PR             [    ]          [    ]            [    ]          [    ]           [    ]       [    ]        [    ]     [    ] 
Research Office                   [    ]          [    ]            [    ]          [    ]           [    ]       [    ]        [    ]     [    ] 
Athletics                              [    ]          [    ]            [    ]          [    ]           [    ]       [    ]        [    ]     [    ] 
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Faculty                                      [    ]          [    ]            [    ]        [    ]       [    ]       [    ]        [    ]     [    ] 
Students                                    [    ]          [    ]            [    ]        [    ]        [    ]      [    ]        [    ]     [    ]     
 
Outside the university 
Board of Regents                       [    ]          [    ]            [    ]         [    ]       [    ]      [    ]       [    ]      [    ]     
System Office                            [    ]          [    ]            [    ]         [    ]       [    ]      [    ]       [    ]      [    ]     
Coordinating Board                   [    ]          [    ]            [    ]         [    ]       [    ]      [    ]       [    ]      [    ]     
State Legislators                        [    ]          [    ]            [    ]         [    ]       [    ]      [    ]       [    ]      [    ] 
Governor’s Office                      [    ]          [    ]            [    ]        [    ]    [    ]     [    ]       [    ]      [    ]     
Other State Agencies                  [    ]         [    ]            [    ]         [    ]        [    ]      [    ]      [    ]      [    ]     
Regional Accreditation Org [    ]         [    ]            [    ]         [    ]        [    ]      [    ]      [    ]      [    ] 
Members of Congress [    ]         [    ]            [    ]         [    ]        [    ]      [    ]      [    ]      [    ] 
Federal Agencies [    ]         [    ]            [    ]         [    ]        [    ]      [    ]      [    ]      [    ] 
Alumni [    ]         [    ]            [    ]         [    ]        [    ]      [    ]      [    ]      [    ] 
Grantmaking Foundations [    ]         [    ]            [    ]         [    ]        [    ]      [    ]      [    ]      [    ] 
Local Business Leaders [    ]         [    ]            [    ]         [    ]        [    ]      [    ]      [    ]      [    ] 
Local Community Leaders [    ]         [    ]            [    ]         [    ]        [    ]      [    ]      [    ]      [    ] 
Other Univ. Presidents [    ]         [    ]            [    ]         [    ]        [    ]      [    ]      [    ]      [    ] 
Athletic Orgs (NCAA) [    ]         [    ]            [    ]         [    ]        [    ]      [    ]      [    ]      [    ] 
 
General Demographic and Attitudinal Questions 
The last few questions concern some basic background information about you. Recall that 
your responses are confidential, and our analyses will not reveal any individual's responses.  
 
Age:_____    Gender:_____________   Race/Ethnicity:_____________________ 
 
How many years have you been at your current university in any capacity?  _________ 
How long have you served as president of your current university?  _________     
How long have you been president of any university  
(including your current university)?  _________ 
Have you ever held elected office (excluding local governments)? ________ 
 
Next, we would like to ask you about public sector organizations in general (not restricted 
to schools or universities).  Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the 
following statements.           
                Strongly                  Strongly  
                 Disagree     Agree 
Public organizations become more efficient when they use 
business practices from the private sector.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Public organizations become more efficient when they have to 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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compete with the private sector. 
Managers of public organizations should be held accountable for 
performance goals and benchmarks. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Managers of public organizations should be given more 
discretion to make decisions regarding their agencies. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Government today has too much “red tape” to be as efficient as 
the private sector. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Without government regulation, free markets often produce 
inequity. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Many of the things that government agencies do are difficult to 
measure quantitatively. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Recent cutbacks in the public sector threaten the quality of 
government services. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Many government agencies are more efficient than people give 
them credit for. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
On a scale of political ideology, individuals can be arranged from strongly liberal to 











































































 Appendix D: Correlation Matrix for Chapter 5 
 
  
